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# Current History

JANUARY, 1961

FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

## West Europe and Continuing Coexistence

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## Coming Next Month...

### THE NEW STATES OF AFRICA

February, 1961

Our February, 1961, issue is a study of the rapid evolution of African independence. It will explore the problems faced by the new states of Africa. Are the independent African states viable? Can they avoid involvement in the continuing cold war. Our contributors will discuss these questions and others like them in the following seven articles:

**THE AFRICAN BLOC AND THE BALANCE OF POWER** by *Rayford W. Logan*, Professor of History, Howard University, and author of *The African Mandates in World Politics*;

**EVOLUTION TOWARD INDEPENDENCE IN BRITISH AFRICA** by *R. C. Pratt*, Department of Political Science, McGill University, and co-author of *The New Deal in Central Africa*;

**GHANA AND INDEPENDENCE** by *Keith Irvine*, editor of "Africa Weekly";

**INDEPENDENCE FOR THE FRENCH COMMUNITY** by *Carroll Quigley*, Professor of European History, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service;

**INDEPENDENCE IN THE CONGO** by *Harry R. Rudin*, Professor of History, Yale University, and author of *Germany and the Cameroons, 1884-1914*;

**INDEPENDENT NIGERIA** by *Thomas P. Melady*, formerly economic advisor to the ministry of commerce of the government of Ethiopia, and author of *Taxation in Underdeveloped Countries*; and

**APARTHEID IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA** by *Joan L. Barkon*, Assistant Editor, CURRENT HISTORY.

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*How stable are the nations of West Europe? Here, articles explore and evaluate their strength in the face of the continuing cold war. Before analyzing specific nations, we are concerned with the prospects of a united Europe. "... Tackling the problem has revealed its formidable difficulties," according to our introductory article. "The political union of Western Europe even in ... diluted form ... has no chance of realization in the foreseeable future." Despite some progress after World War II "the desire to belong to a larger fatherland called Europe transcends the sense of national self-identification in none of the Western European nations."*

## Unification of Europe: A Balance Sheet

By KARL LOEWENSTEIN

*William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science,  
Amherst College*

### I

FOR MORE than a decade the integration of Western Europe has been one of the principal tenets of American foreign policy, endorsed, with rare unanimity, by successive administrations, political parties and public opinion. The underlying motives are a curious blend of idealism and realism. Since the merger of the thirteen colonies proved successful, a similar federal solution was suggested for Western Europe. A political union once and for all would do away with the wars among the European nations into which the United States, on two recent occasions, had been drawn.

Ideas as well as enlightened self-interest induced the United States to invent and generously to implement the European recovery program (Marshall Plan, 1947) by which Western Europe was saved from near-collapse and started on the road towards the unparalleled prosperity it now enjoys. With the onset of the cold war against communism support of European integration was strengthened by the defense argument.

Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) the United States attempted, by including Western Europe in the collective security system, a defense in depth into which subsequently (1955) Germany was admitted. The expectation that economic and military integration of Western Europe would ultimately lead to a closer political union remained one of the cornerstones of American foreign policy.

This discussion will attempt to analyze the present stage of European unification after a decade of efforts undertaken with more purpose and good will than ever before. It will first summarize the existing European institutions—and the reader is duly warned of their bewildering multiplicity and complexity—and thereafter focus on the non-institutional imponderables that stand in the way, at this time and in the foreseeable future, of a full consummation of European unity.

### II

In the past all efforts to unify Europe were either confined to theoretical speculation

(Dante, Enea Silvio, Abbé de Saint Pierre, Immanuel Kant) or to ultimately abortive structures of hegemonic domination by force of a single power (Napoleon, Hitler). After the last war, however, the idea of European unity gained considerable popular favor in the form of the European movement. From the start two different approaches confronted one another. The federalist school advocated the immediate establishment of a political federal organization, assuming that by necessity economic integration would follow in its wake. The functionalists, on the other hand, wished to accomplish unification step-by-step, with limited purpose integration in specific economic fields as the pace-maker for political unity.

The latter school, with historical experience on its side, prevailed. Its ultimate goal was not reached. Nonetheless, under the functional approach, the economic integration of the six states of what is called Little Europe, namely France, Western Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, made greater strides forward than at any time in the past.

(1) *The Council of Europe (C.E.)*. The first result of the federalist pressure on governments and parliaments was the Council of Europe (1949) consisting at present of 15 member states,<sup>1</sup> with its seat in Strasbourg. Its institutions are: (a) the Consultative Assembly of 135 members chosen by the national parliaments from among their own members and meeting, for short sessions, twice a year; (b) the Council of Ministers, acting on the recommendations of the Assembly; each minister possesses the veto power; (c) the permanent Secretariat.

Great expectations remained unfulfilled. At no time did the C.E. electrify European public opinion, nor could it develop into a responsible European parliament. Its main achievement to date is the establishment (Rome Treaty of November 4, 1957) of a European Commission and a European Court of Human Rights, both now in operation. At the most the Council functions today as a useful forum for the discussion of common European concerns. Even its symbolic value has paled. Its disappearance would leave no gap.

(2) *The Organization of European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.)*. To all practical intents and purposes O.E.E.C. was, and remains, the most effective European organization. Established with its seat in Paris by treaty (1948) among 16 European states, the United States and Canada being associated members, O.E.E.C. at first served for the execution and implementation of the American-sponsored European Recovery Program embodied in the Marshall Plan. By the accession of Western Germany (1955), Austria (1956), and Spain (1959), the membership rose to 19.

O.E.E.C. is based entirely on the voluntary cooperation of all members in equal status. Initially it functioned as the planning and distributing agency for United States assistance. With the expiration of the American aid program (1952) which all told expended \$19 billion, O.E.E.C. proved itself so valuable that the organization was extended indefinitely for the long-range policy of liberalizing inter-European trade by voluntarily lowering trade barriers.

One of its major accomplishments was the establishment (1950) of the European Payments Union. After nine years' operation during which it functioned as the clearing house for the trade balances of its members, it reached its goal of the free convertibility of European currencies and was terminated. O.E.E.C. had become so indispensable for the European economy that in 1960 a reform plan—as yet rather nebulous—was under consideration. Rechristened Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the new 21 nation group, to include the United States and Canada as full members, would extend its cooperative techniques to the economic policies of the Western world in general and would coordinate assistance to underdeveloped countries.

(3) *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)*. Called into existence (1949) by United States initiative as a counter-move against potential Communist aggression, its membership, after the accession of Western Germany (1955), comes to 18. Absentees, because of their neutrality policy, are

<sup>1</sup> The reader desirous to inform himself of the composition of the various organizations is referred to the chart, Existing European Organizations, below. The latter may also assist him in familiarizing himself with the perplexing variety of abbreviations now commonly used.



EXISTING EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS

	O.E.E.C.	C.E.	Nato	E.C.S.C.	W.E.U.	E.E.C.	Euratom
Austria	x	x					
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Denmark	x	x	x				
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x				
Iceland	x	x	x				
Ireland	x	x					
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Norway	x	x	x				
Portugal	x		x				
Spain	x						
Sweden	x	x					
Switzerland	x						
Turkey	x	x	x				
United Kingdom	x	x	x		x		

Abbreviations

O.E.E.C. = Organization for European Economic Co-operation

C.E. = Council of Europe

Nato = North Atlantic Treaty Organization

E.C.S.C. = European Coal and Steel Community

W.E.U. = Western European Union

E.E.C. = European Economic Community

Euratom = European Atomic Energy Community

Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Eire. From the beginning Nato had the dual character of serving as a military instrument of American defense and as a protective shield of Western Europe. As a corollary the Americans expected, through common defense against common danger, to promote a closer political and economic approximation of the Western European nations.

After the Communist attack on South Korea (1950) the American policymakers, apprehensive of a similar Communist foray in Central Europe, requested the inclusion of Western Germany in the defense of Western Europe, thereby completely abandoning the permanent demilitarization of Germany, one of the principal goals of the last war. After long and difficult negotiations the French fear of the revival of Germany's military power was overcome by the formation of the European Defense Community (E.D.C., 1952), consisting of the military forces of France, Italy, Western Germany and the Benelux countries under an inter-European command. The British refused to participate. The project, ill-advised from the start, foundered in the French National Assembly (August 30, 1954).

The failure was offset, at least on paper, by the establishment of the Western Euro-

pean Union (W.E.U.) in the Paris treaties of October, 1954. German rearmament, envisaging 12 divisions, was placed within the frame of the Brussels Treaty (1946) of which the United Kingdom was a member. The military forces of the seven states were placed under the supreme command of Nato. The relations of W.E.U. to Nato were never clarified; today W.E.U. is completely forgotten.

Nato was an artificial construct from its inception. Its history is that of incessant crises never resolved. Today it is in visible decline. The Germans were in no hurry to make their contribution to European defense, which would have detracted their energy from the lucrative export trade; today only five divisions are activated. France, cool from the start to the entire scheme and since 1954 engaged in the Algerian war draining manpower and resources, became openly hostile to Nato after de Gaulle's advent to power (1958). De Gaulle's concept of French national sovereignty impelled him to withdraw the French Mediterranean fleet from Nato command, to prohibit the installation of nuclear bases on French soil and to enact other measures castrating Nato. The general's policy is to reduce Nato to an old-

style military alliance of sovereign states in which each determines the use of its military forces in accordance with the national interest. In the same vein he proposed a complete reform of the Nato structure which, instead of collective management, would result in a tripartite directorate composed of France, Britain and the United States, engaged in global strategy. The scheme was received with ill grace elsewhere, particularly in Germany and the United States.

However, the heaviest blow against Nato is being struck by the intervening revolution in military strategy. Nato may have been useful as long as the United States possessed the atomic monopoly. In all likelihood the warfare of the future will consist of atomic attack and retaliation in which conventional forces will be more or less outmoded. Its primary target would be Central Europe, Germany in the first place. The original *raison d'être* of Nato has become largely deprived of reality. If it were one of the underlying assumptions of Nato that common defense is a major incentive for political unity, Nato proved an unmitigated failure. In this period of prosperity and rising living standards the European nations do not share the American obsession with the cold war. Nato and its military appendices proved a divisive rather than a unifying force of Western Europe.

(4) *The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.)*. The most significant efforts to unify Western Europe focus on the group of Six spoken of as Little Europe. Among these measures the first and so far most successful cooperative or "Community" scheme is E.C.S.C., known also by the name of its initiator as the Schuman plan. Its purpose is the establishment of a common market in coal, steel and their byproducts. It has introduced the novel and truly revolutionary device of the supranational authority as the command and control center through which the cooperative arrangements acquire a quasifederal character. Within the fields assigned to it the High Authority directs and regulates the individual plants, mines and business enterprises within the Six without the intervention of the national governments which thus agree to the partial surrender of sovereignty. The institutions of E.C.S.C. located in Luxembourg, are:

the nine member High Authority; the Consultative Committee consisting of an equal number of representatives of management, labor and the consumers; the Council of Ministers to "harmonize" the policies of the High Authority; and the Court of Justice.

Spectacular accomplishments to date justify the boldness of the initiators. Trade within the Six in the various products under regulation has risen by 40 per cent. Tariffs, quotas and discriminatory freight rates have disappeared. Investments are guided by the High Authority which obtained large loans abroad for distribution among its clients. The cooperative effort has resulted in the establishment of a common market in the two basic commodities, raising the output to the second largest in the world, surpassed only by the United States.

E.C.S.C., which had appeared at first to management, particularly in France, as a leap into the dark, is now fully endorsed by management in all six states, while labor, little interested in the expansion of markets with continued full employment at home, remains more skeptical, considering (and not without justification) E.C.S.C. a huge cartel. By now the common market in coal and steel has implanted itself so deeply in the economic life that a return to the previous system of national competition seems well-nigh impossible.

However, of late the horizon of E.C.S.C. has become heavily overcast. Efforts of the High Authority to dismantle the cartel practices, one of the major objectives of the Community, proved only mildly effective. Moreover, the initial success appeared predicated on the continued sellers' market. In 1959, overproduction of coal resulted in unsaleable stocks rising at the pitheads, which in turn led to unemployment and unrest, particularly in the Ruhr and the coal fields of the Belgian Borinage. At that time, the measures of the High Authority to alleviate the crisis were either disobeyed outright by the national governments, or circumvented by economic pressures, or had to be abandoned in the face of resistance. E.C.S.C. proved to be a fair weather craft. In the first major storm it lost its seaworthiness.

(5) *The European Economic Community (E.E.C.)*, commonly spoken of as the Common Market, was conceived in the cli-

mate of optimism concerning the progressive economic integration of the Six of Little Europe, and embodied in the Rome Treaty (March 27, 1957), a document of 378 pages. E.E.C. aims at extending the principle of the common market applied with success to coal and steel to the entire economies of the Six, by gradually eliminating, within 12 to 15 years, all trade barriers among them. Within the ultimately established customs union, goods, services, investments and labor are to move freely to create a mass market of 170 million people. Its institutions are: (a) the Council of Ministers, whose major decisions require unanimity; (b) the nine-member Commission as the executive organ; different from E.C.S.C., however, its major resolutions are subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers; (c) the Assembly of 132 members appointed by the national parliaments; and (d) the Court of Justice. The seat of the organization is in Brussels.

To avoid duplication the respective assemblies of E.C.S.C., E.E.C. and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (see below) were merged into a single assembly (March 20, 1958), styling itself somewhat prematurely the "European parliament." The significant difference of E.E.C. from E.C.S.C. is that its arrangement does not involve a partial surrender of sovereignty. The Commission is not a supranational authority. The center of gravity has shifted back to the national governments assembled in the Council of Ministers.

Entering into force on January 1, 1958, the Common Market proceeded to the planned first tariff reduction by ten per cent on January 1, 1959. During the year 1959 the stimulation of trade within the Six assumed spectacular proportions; French exports rose by 33 per cent, Italian, by 17, German, by 12. By the middle of 1960, however, the pace had slackened visibly.

The second slash of ten per cent scheduled for January 1, 1960, had to be postponed. Difficulties arose on two different fronts, internally and externally. By 1960, the concept of supranationalism had become unfashionable. The pendulum swung back to the primacy of the national economic interest. The advent of de Gaulle accentuated the trend, but it spread to Germany's Chan-

cellor Konrad Adenauer, who was exposed to the conflicting pressures of domestic interests resisting further inroads into national self-determination. A widening cleavage developed also between the French and German governments and the professional Europeans and technocrats in the Brussels Commission whose president, Professor Walter Hallstein, is suspected of desiring to be recorded by history as the Bismarck or Cavour of the United States of Europe.

The treaty contains several hardship or escape clauses permitting the partners to restrict foreign imports that would seriously endanger a specific sector of the national economy. These began to be invoked frequently by Germany and also Italy. But the truly neuralgic problem of the common market proved to be the assimilation of agriculture envisaged by the Treaty to be accomplished only between 1967 and 1970.

Protective tariffs and state subsidies for the peasant are an inveterate European habit. In particular the German farmer is doing exceedingly well because the wheat price is pegged, by government subvention, far above the world market price. When the empire builders in Brussels, realizing that the tide is running against them, proposed the acceleration of the common market in agriculture (1960) (the so-called Mansholt plan) Adenauer balked. Lower agricultural prices would have led to the revolt of the villages and to the loss of the election in 1961 by the defection of the farmers loyal to the government party. The Ministers' Conference in Brussels (July, 1960) decided to postpone the inclusion of the agricultural sector in the Common Market indefinitely. Without it, however, only a truncated torso remains.

Other no less thorny problems arose whose dimensions were hidden iceberg-like below the surface. A common market requires the "harmonization"—this has become a European key word—of the entire socio-economic structure of the partners such as: social and fiscal legislation; company law; banking and investment techniques; labor matters; monetary policies, and many others. At present some of the best minds of the Six are busily engaged in comparative research developing an entirely new branch of inter-European social science. As yet none of the many

projects has proceeded beyond the study stage. In short, once the formidable difficulties of a common market had been fully realized, the heady wine of European integration had to be heavily watered.

(6) *The European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.)*. Even before E.E.C. had begun to operate, and increasingly so after the first tariff reduction of ten per cent, the European nations outside the Six became apprehensive of the repercussions of the planned customs union on their trade. After protracted negotiations had failed the British organized as a countermove the E.F.T.A., consisting of the so-called Outer Seven (United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Portugal and Austria).<sup>2</sup> Its aim is the establishment of an integral free trade area among its members—agriculture again excepted—while each member may freely determine its external trade policies towards all other states. The British, thus, could maintain their preferential tariffs with the Commonwealth. Ultimately, they suggested, the E.F.T.A. should be extended to all states of Western Europe, including the Inner Six. The first across-the-board reduction of 20 per cent among the members of E.F.T.A. occurred on July 1, 1960. In the controversy between the "Sixes and Sevens" the United States more or less openly sided with the Six.

The relative economic strength of the two blocs is shown by the following figures. The total imports of the Six, with 169 million people, amounted to \$24.2 billion (1959) of which \$8.1 billion were with one another and \$3.9 billion with the Outer Seven. The total imports of the latter, with 89 million people, were \$20 billion, of which \$3.2 billion were with one another and \$5.6 billion stemmed from the Six. The figures indicate that competitive access to the Six is vital for the Seven. The situation is aggravated by the plan of the Brussels Commission to accelerate the timetable of the Common Market to the effect that by January 1, 1962, the reduction of the tariffs among the Six should reach 50 per cent instead of the originally planned 30 per cent. The Seven have a cogent argument in their favor by virtue of the mutual obligations undertaken by the Six in the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT), in force since 1947, which entitles all members to the most-favored-nation treatment.

Negotiations conducted by the governments as well as by the so-called Committee of the Twenty-One, set up by O.E.E.C. as a go-between, have proved unavailing so far. There is no gainsaying that Western Europe, instead of organically advancing towards economic unity, today is a house divided. No trade war has broken out, nor is it likely to break out. A compromise, if only a temporary one, is to be expected, on a product-by-product basis and perhaps with GATT as the frame of reference. One of the main stumbling blocks is the group of empire builders in Brussels who wish to make the economic integration of the Six impregnable against all coming events.

(7) *The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)*. Euratom was created simultaneously with the Common Market. It is a "Community" of the Six for the joint exploitation of atomic energy. Obviously the field lends itself most readily to the co-operative effort of pooling technical know-how and financial resources. Its institutions are closely patterned on those of the Common Market, that is, without the injection of a supranational authority. For the time being, Euratom concentrates on scientific research and the development of techniques, served, among others, by the research center at Ispra (Italy), and the construction of atomic reactors. Meanwhile, however, the very premise on which Euratom is predicated, namely the expected scarcity of power hamstringing economic development, is seriously challenged, primarily by the over-production of coal in Europe, the cheapness of American coal imports, the discovery of new sources of oil and gas in France, Italy, Libya, the Sahara. In addition, reactors prove to be so costly to construct that private and public enterprise is reluctant to enter the field. In the light of these facts the American-Euratom Treaty (November 8, 1958) is considered excessively onerous. Even in this technical and strictly non-political field the ardor of Europeanization has cooled.

(8) *A European Political Community*.

<sup>2</sup> Recently (September, 1960) Finland, with Mr. Khrushchev's blessings, was permitted to join.



All attempts to date to take the European bull by its federalistic horns have failed. In the springtime of the European idea the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe, at the instigation of the latter's Consultative Assembly, charged (September, 1952) the Assembly of E.C.S.C. to draft a political constitution for the "European Political Community." The Assembly, somewhat enlarged as the *ad hoc* Assembly, duly delivered an elaborate draft for a bicameral federal European organization to the Council of Ministers (March, 1953) which deservedly buried the utopian blueprint in its files. Since that time the federalist idea is in complete eclipse and even the much more moderate supranational concept has become outmoded.

Another twist of the political wheel was applied by General de Gaulle (September, 1960). He proclaimed the need for intensified cooperation among the Six in the military, economic, cultural and political fields. Significantly, however, applying the celebrated semantics of the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland, what he understands by political unity is at the most a loose European confederation of sovereign states; his *l'Europe des Patries* is a far cry from the United States of Europe. As a face-saving gesture he called for closer organizational contacts among the Governments of the Six and the establishment of permanent committees or secretariats in the respective fields. To soften the body blow to the European concept de Gaulle topped his plan with the call for a plebiscite among the peoples of the Six to confirm their attachment to Europe. The French, by now tolerantly resigned to the intellectual gyrations of their republican monarch, took the project in their stride, but it evoked open hostility among the partners, by now surfeited by "institutionalized" European arrangements, and in Nato.

The general's policy is not devoid of Macchiavellian overtones. These permanent secretariats, on the one hand, would take the wind out of the sails of the Community institutions. The economic committee would be competitive with the Brussels Commission of the Common Market, and, thus, deflate its supranational allures; on this score de Gaulle does not fail to have the sympathy of Adenauer who likewise lately has noticeably

cooled towards the over-ambitious "European" technocrats. The permanent military committee on the other hand, could not but evolve into a sort of Nato within Nato, an inner core of the Six, which, under France's leadership because of her membership in the atomic club, would aim at diminishing the American preponderance in Nato. This, however, runs counter to Adenauer's view of Nato as a basic premise of German foreign policy. The political union of Western Europe even in this diluted form of a loose confederation has no chance of realization in the foreseeable future.

### III

In the light of the preceding summary of existing European organizations the progress towards closer cooperation, particularly of the members of the Six, is impressive. A return to the traditional power struggle exploding from time to time in war among them is unthinkable. Yet this marked success should not obscure the fact that the Union of Europe, or even of Western Europe, is remote, perhaps remoter than before because tackling the problem has revealed its formidable difficulties. Discarding the facile oversimplification of nationalism and sovereignty as the villains of the drama the following discussion will attempt to summarize some of the imponderables that stand in the way of the consummation of the European concept.

(1) Paradoxically the unprecedented prosperity that prevails in most of Western Europe militates against any change of the *status quo* satisfactory to all beneficiaries. Everywhere the level of living standards reached, and the safe expectation of their further rise, dissuades from further experimentation. That the establishment of a common market for 260 million people will substantially raise them appears to the masses a theoretical speculation beyond their grasp. And in the case of a reversal of the current boom whose continuation is by no means assured each nation will think only of itself.

(2) Western Europe is far less obsessed by the cold war and its tactics than the United States. Any sentiment of urgency for common defense is totally lacking. Few responsible people in Western Europe—except the politicians and the military who thrive on it—fear a Soviet attack in the immediate or

distant future. With their inexhaustible memory of the ebb and tide of clashing ideologies the Europeans take the Marxist gospel of the inevitability of war—now largely discarded by the Soviets themselves—with a pound rather than a grain of salt. Nobody in his senses believes that the Soviets, engaged in a gigantic drive for higher living standards for their masses, would risk all they have achieved laboriously since the Nazi depredations in an all-out war. If war comes it will destroy them as much as their enemies. Consequently, the military or common defense argument for unification has no appeal whatsoever.

(3) A closer analysis of the attitudes of the various social classes towards Europeanization will reveal that the idea still has insufficient grassroots; certainly less than it did a decade ago. If certain intellectuals invoke the image of the common patrimony of the *Abendland*, such incantations of an esoteric coterie have no influence on either the masses or the new managerial élite in governments and business.

(a) The most convinced supporters of European economic integration are found among big business and industry. They are the real beneficiaries of E.C.S.C. and, possibly, of the Common Market. This applies today also to the French business leaders who ten years ago were reluctant to endorse the Community plans because of their fear of Germany's economic superiority. Business and industry are aware of the potential new empires economic integration would open for them.

(b) Small business, on the other hand, has little to gain from Europeanization. As in the United States, if at a slower pace, the big are pushing the small irresistibly against the wall. Large segments of Western Europe are not ready for the mass market and mass production. Handicrafts still play an important economic role on the domestic market. Factory production would exterminate them.

(c) Organized labor likewise at the most is lukewarm towards economic integration and openly hostile towards its political implications. The prevailing boom with high wages is responsible for the current retrogression of the trade union movement. The de-

cline of European Socialist parties (even though it could be temporary) is another facet of the rising living standards. Moreover, labor has positive grounds for dissatisfaction with the two Communities of E.C.S.C. and E.E.C. One of the most prominent aims of both organizations is the free movement of labor across the borders in accordance with the requirements of the domestic labor market. The results to date are thoroughly disappointing. Italy, with her chronic unemployment, is the main victim. Germany, where labor is scarce, imports unskilled workers to a large extent from Greece and Spain, both not members of the Six. In the case of a recession each nation would disregard the needs of others.

(4) How much do the Western European nations know one another and how much do their national ways of life tally? In this period of prosperity tourism flourishes as never before; Europe has become a common playground, accessible by motorization even to the lower strata now. Youth mingles freely with youth and dotes on foreign experience. But such encouraging signs of increased mutual contacts and interests must not be overstressed. Better knowledge is not necessarily to be equated with better liking. The memories of the not too distant past are far from being eradicated. Below the surface linger doubts concerning the sincerity of German democratization and her relinquishment of massive aggressiveness. The German tourist does little to dissipate them.

When it comes to pinpointing the attitudes of the different European nations towards life this much is certain, that there exists a single ideology shared by all, to wit the belief in, and the desire for, better living standards. But here the national environment comes first. The desire to belong to a larger fatherland called Europe transcends the sense of national self-identification in none of the Western European nations. The basic prerequisite of European unity, the absorption of the national identities by the higher European ideal, is conspicuous by its absence.

(5) An attempt to analyze the attitudes of the individual nations towards European unification is adversely affected by the rapidly changing currents and the incalculable leadership element. The positions of Germany and

France are inextricably tied up with the personalities of Adenauer and de Gaulle. The sincerity of the European-mindedness of each is not open to doubt. Its core is Franco-German *rapprochement* as the pivot of European unity. However, their motivations and policies diverge so widely that, since the Rambouillet meeting between the two leaders (July, 1960) Franco-German concordance has been exposed to a severe strain.

Adenauer's Europeanism is eminently practical because intensified Europeanization is the guarantee of the continued American presence. His approach to European unity centers on Nato much more than on other institutionalized European arrangements. These appear merely as a corollary or by-product of the basic premise of German policy, that is, to secure through Nato the continued American presence on the continent as a protection against the Soviets.

For de Gaulle, on the other hand, Europeanization has an altogether different connotation. About the military value of Nato he is more skeptical, and, therefore, more realistic than his German counterpart. A decisive component of his attitude towards Western European unity—and on this score he is supported by the other partners in the Six—is the ever-present if officially never admitted fear of the German giant.

Any step towards further political integration is a step leading the other partners of the Six automatically into the quagmire of German foreign policy aspirations. These are foremost Germany's drive for the unification

with Eastern Germany, in time eventually the demands for the restoration of the territories lost in the East. A casual hint by de Gaulle that Germany should resign herself to the Oder-Neisse line was deeply resented by Adenauer and Germany. None of the statesmen and peoples of Western Europe are prepared to convert, by closer union, the German problems into a joint responsibility of the Six. With anxiety all of Western Europe observes the multiplying signs of renascent German nationalism.

Finally, another paradox, the very predominance of Adenauer and de Gaulle on the European scene, though both are proven Europeans, appears a liability rather than an asset for the progress of European unity. Both key figures, respected as they are nationally and internationally, are considered by European public opinion strictly transient, if only for biological reasons. Will those taking the helm after them be equally devoted Europeans?

(6) The British reluctance towards the Six of Little Europe, not to speak of the futuristic United States of Europe, is less subtle. Though Britons may not share France's apprehension of Germany's economic hegemony in Western Europe which they are confident they could counterbalance, they are averse to subjecting any sector of national self-determination to a supranational authority which they cannot control. Moreover, the economic position of the United Kingdom is different. Britain is Janus-headed. Geographically she belongs to Western Europe, economically to the entire world.

She is the leading member of the Commonwealth—possibly the most effective association of states in our time—which takes no less than 45 per cent of British exports. With the Commonwealth members she shares the benefits of the preferential tariffs under the Ottawa conference (1932). To enter the customs union of the Six, Britain would need the unanimous consent of the Commonwealth. Entering without such consent would break up the Commonwealth. Consequently, the Finance Ministers of the Commonwealth states assembled in London for their annual economic conference (September, 1960) bluntly put the British government on notice that any closer cooperation of

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Britain with the Six would jeopardize the Commonwealth interests, thus putting the brakes on any lingering British desire to have its cake and also eat it.

(7) Wide divergencies exist in Western Europe also in the attitude towards the United States. In this context anti-Americanism, though widespread, is a minor irritant only. What is near-universal, however, is the understandable if selfish desire not to be used by the United States as a pawn in its power struggle with the Russians. In the U-2 incident the United States had no friend in Western Europe. To the mass of the common people and considerable sectors of the intellectuals the appraisal of the United States and the Russians amounts to a plague on both their houses. If properly left alone Western Europe, with the exception of Germany for defense reasons, is fully prepared for peaceful competition and coexistence. And be it noted, as a unified "third force," Western Europe would not necessarily be allied with the United States against the Communist world. She would prefer to be a neutral rather than a battleground.

#### IV

The makers of American foreign policy and those who make it their business to interpret it for public consumption should take cognizance of the undeniable if unpalatable fact that, after a most promising start, the drive for economic and political union of Western Europe has bogged down. The curve of Europeanization so steeply rising after the last war has flattened out and is beginning to fall. That a recession or depression would accomplish what prosperity has failed to achieve appears most unlikely. The intrinsic difficulties of welding together traditionally independent national identities came into the open only when the idea was put to the acid test.

The most that can be forecast in the foreseeable future is the consolidation of the existing cooperative institutions and a cautious exploration of additional avenues without utopian supranationalism. The idealists on both sides of the Atlantic must resign themselves to the fact that, barring untoward events, the union of Western Europe, let alone the United States of Europe, has little chance of foreseeable realization.

"Although the United Nations may be envisaged as performing important functions, the main duty and responsibilities still rest on the shoulders of its member nations. While the struggle between the great goes on, the large majority cannot sit idly by, watching the tragedy roll on before their eyes. They also have an important duty to perform and a great stake in ensuring the welfare of the world. Their actions or omissions may either enhance or gravely affect the chances of world peace. Now, with the increased membership of our Organization, the role that smaller nations can play in world affairs, and particularly in the Organization, cannot be insignificant. . . .

"As we see it, the first duty of smaller nations is to refrain from doing anything that may worsen the present delicate international situation. All of us, I feel sure, deeply realize that we have absolutely no interest in witnessing a struggle between the great of the world. Even though we may not be directly involved in that struggle, we are bound to feel and to be affected by its repercussions. In my country we have a saying that whenever two elephants fight the grass is crushed under their feet. In this case, smaller nations may hardly be compared to grass but, somehow or other, the struggle between great nations is likely to produce adverse effects upon their existence. . . .

"On the positive side, small nations acting together, either within the framework of the United Nations or outside it, can and will make their weight felt. They have already been able to do so in the past; there is no reason why they should not be able to do it again in the future. In the performance of this task there is no need for any formal alliance; all nations of goodwill, from all sides, may join in, irrespective of their political commitments. . . ."—*Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, in an address before the U.N. General Assembly, September 27, 1960.*



*Analyzing United States commitments in and responsibilities toward a united Europe, this author declares that if the bonds of Western integration are strengthened, "... the West will have to acknowledge that Nikita Khrushchev has a hand in it. The harsh, strident note which he has reintroduced into Soviet policy and actions has chilled Western spirits and reactivated the need to draw together."*

# The United States and a United Europe

By ALLAN S. NANES

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**A**LTHOUGH the concept of a European federation can hardly be called new,<sup>1</sup> it has been infused with a fresh vigor since the end of World War II, and has attained a greater degree of realization. This is largely the result of the bitter fruits of war, the need to reconstruct a shattered economy, and fear of the expansive thrust of Soviet communism. But if the European community owed much of its impetus to what may perhaps be characterized as negative motivations, that community is thriving today because of the positive benefits it confers.

From the outset, the United States has supported the drive for European integration. This support is based on the consideration that a strong and solvent economy in Western Europe is conducive to political

stability, which in turn enhances Europe's ability to resist Communist penetration. It is of course part and parcel of a policy which is aimed at increasing the strength and welfare of the free nations of Western Europe, reducing their vulnerability to internal or external Communist pressure, and linking West Germany so closely to the rest of Western Europe as to obviate any chance of its breaking away.<sup>2</sup> This policy was considered essential for the security of the United States and this estimate is still deemed valid. Indeed, it was one of the principal goals of post-war American foreign policy to receive a substantial measure of success.

In addition to the very real security interests which underlie American encouragement of the integration of Western Europe, there is perhaps an emotional appeal as well. That appeal lies in the success of the federal idea in this country, which makes it seem to many an attractive political prescription for curing Europe's ills. However it may sound to Europeans, a "United States of Europe" rings well in many American ears. Indeed, our government has displayed no visible apprehension over the implications of the supranational institutions now evolving in Western Europe. Thus it seems possible to

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<sup>1</sup> It dates back at least to the Fifteenth Century. It is amazing how much the so-called grand design of Henry IV resembles the Nato organization of today.

<sup>2</sup> Moore, Ben T., *Euratom, The American Interest in the European Atomic Energy Community*, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958, p. 32.

speculate that the American government would not find the coalescence of Western Europe into a single political entity to be a distasteful development. What could cause anxiety, however, would be the role such a federal union might wish to play on the world stage.

### A New Competitor?

Just as America has displayed no fear over the possible political consequences of European integration, so it has shown little worry at the suggestion that we may also be helping to create too powerful an economic competitor. Instead we have actively supported those functional communities which are the agencies of the unity movement. Our active financial and political support was extended to the Coal and Steel Community in order to permit its successful launching.<sup>3</sup> By the same token, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Common Market came into being with official American endorsement. On November 8, 1958, the United States signed an agreement with Euratom whereby we agreed to furnish technical assistance, nuclear material, and a line of credit with the Export-Import Bank for \$135 million. In addition, there is a joint U.S.-Euratom program of research and development.

This American support of Euratom, while part of our over-all policy, is not without a *quid pro quo*. For with conventional power relatively cheap in this country, there is little incentive to develop nuclear power for commercial purposes. Thus Euratom offers the United States a huge research facility for the rapid development of nuclear power.<sup>4</sup>

### The U.S. Benefits

In a like manner, American backing for the economic community, or Common Market, is rooted in the belief that not only will that community be a good thing economically and politically for Europe, but that it will also mean expanded markets for the United States. The Common Market should bring expanded trade within its boundaries, but the member states certainly do not wish to reduce their trade with non-members. American corporations have been hastening to establish European branches, seeking to

tap the anticipated rich profits of this expanded trade.

On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, these corporate arrangements are designed to get behind the screen of the single external Common Market tariff.<sup>5</sup> For there seems to be little question that by its very nature this single external tariff will be discriminatory. This discrimination will be of a new kind, consisting of lowered internal tariff barriers within the community, but in essence it appears to be similar to any protective tariff. In that sense it can be said to be adverse to American interests, or to the interests of any outside party, for that matter.

With respect to the specific impact of the Common Market on America's trading position, there seems to be substantial agreement. Thus it is anticipated that our raw materials exports will not suffer appreciably. In fact it may well be that increased economic activity within the community will mean increased demand for American ores, textile fibers, raw chemicals, and under some conditions even foodstuffs. Where the tariff may have an unfavorable effect on our exports is in certain manufactured products, such as chemicals, machinery and automobiles. In addition the African dependencies of the member countries will be in a preferred position, and to some degree this may cut into the import of primary products from the United States.

While the common external tariff will be one factor affecting America's foreign trade, another of equal importance should be the advantageous position of European products within the Common Market, and in third markets as well. Indeed the impact of increased productivity within the Common Market, combined with the lower wages that still prevail, is already being felt by American producers who export to these outside markets.

Despite these factors, it is believed that the success of the Common Market will be beneficial to the American economy. The in-

<sup>3</sup> A. S. Nanes and Reuben Efron, "The European Community and the United States: Evolving Relations," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 2, April, 1960, p. 179.

<sup>4</sup> Klaus Knorr, "American Foreign Policy and the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," *Atoms for Power*, The American Assembly, Columbia University, New York, 1957, for further discussion.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen Spiegelglas, "The Prospects for U.S. Exports to the Common Market," *Business Horizons*, Vol. 3, No. 3, fall, 1960, p. 62.

creased economic activity expected within the community's borders should result in increased trading opportunities for America. After all, the Common Market will encompass 165 million people, with an economic potential compared to the United States of roughly 17 to 20 million, in other words, almost the same.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore Jean Monnet, the architect of European unity, has forecast that by 1975 the economic community will have a rate of industrial production and a living standard equal to that of the United States as of the present time. If these predictions of growth are substantially realized, the expectations of benefits to the American economy should be realized as well.

Furthermore, the Common Market is a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), which predicates a liberal trading system. As such it has already extended certain tariff reductions to all countries, and by their membership in this broader agreement the Common Market countries are pledged to see to it that no customs union establishes an external tariff more restrictive in effect than the tariffs of the individual countries comprising that union. For these reasons, among others, it has been asserted that any harsh effects of the common European trading system will be minor.

Of course the evolution of the Common Market will depend to a great extent on the commercial policies followed by the United States. To the degree that we make it difficult for goods and services produced in the Common Market countries to be sold in the American market, we are likely to face retaliation in kind. If the Common Market evolves in a protectionist direction, it may hurt us, but it may hurt Latin America, one-third of whose exports go to Western Europe, even more. It is eventualities such as this that the United States must consider. In short, the development of the Common Market and America's reaction to it are of vital importance for a broad range of foreign policy problems which reach to the very heart of the Western world position.

### Two Trade Groups

The crucial bearing of these economic problems on Western cohesion and strength

is nowhere better illustrated than by reference to the current division of Europe into two trading blocs. The Common Market has a rival in the European Free Trade Association, also known as the "Outer Seven," comprising Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. The prime mover in setting up the Free Trade Association was Britain, which had continually resisted not only a common external tariff, but the idea of organic ties to the European Community. Britain found a sympathetic audience in the Scandinavian countries, who feared the competition of the Common Market.

In surface terms, the basic difference between the two trading communities lies in the fact that the Common Market imposes a single external tariff, while the members of the Free Trade Association impose their own national import duties. But underlying this outward difference is a philosophical divergence, with the Europe of the Six committed to strengthening the organic basis of European unity, while the Seven remain somewhat skeptical of the integration concept. Furthermore, the Six retain a certain bitterness toward Britain, whose pleading of Commonwealth ties and special position *vis à vis* the United States seemed to them a manifestation of wanting to have one's cake and eat it too, using Europe for commercial purposes while not helping to build its unity.

It was this bitterness, and indeed intransigence, which for a time threatened a full scale trade war within the Western bloc. Only last spring all proposals for compromise seemed to have foundered. But in the last few months prospects have improved. The British have announced that they are ready to reverse their previous position and will consider proposals for joining the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom. Chancellor Adenauer, a great champion of united Europe, has apparently abandoned pressure for further supranational progress, and seems willing to compromise on some kind of European-wide trading system, as desired by the "Outer Seven." The British and West Germans have already held talks on this subject.

Naturally, the United States is eager to

<sup>6</sup> George Bailey, "Germany: Divided and Indivisible," *The Reporter*, April 2, 1959, p. 23.

avoid any further development of the rift in the Western camp. As long as it continues it can only serve to benefit the Communists. Thus we will probably welcome whatever means are devised to heal the breach. Of course, since the interests of the entire Western bloc are at stake, our pretensions to leadership of that bloc impose upon us the obligation to search actively for a solution. In this instance the record shows that we have been so engaged with a creditable degree of imagination. Our proposals were advanced by Undersecretary of State Dillon in Paris, in January of 1960. They called for a new economic organization linking the United States and Canada to Western Europe, and the demise of the Office of European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.). This new economic unit would aim at organizing the free world market, and liberalizing trade beyond what has been achieved by G.A.T.T. Encompassing both the Six and the Seven, it would presumably eliminate the possibility of any trade war. At the same time it should reduce the possibility of discrimination against our trade at a time when we no longer enjoy the advantages which accrued to us in the immediate post-war era.

In addition, the Dillon proposals called for increased aid, on an international scale, to underdeveloped countries. We would attempt, together with European countries which have been the beneficiaries of our aid, to develop a program of joint investment in these areas. Thus the Dillon proposals represent an attempt to evolve an integrated economic policy which would be coordinated with the political needs of the West. Of course, implementation of the proposals depends upon the new administration, but during the campaign, at least, both Kennedy and Nixon agreed that other countries should bear a larger share of the development burden.

If a reconciliation of the two European trading communities is effected, and if some over-all Western plan of economic development is adopted, the West will have to acknowledge that Nikita Khrushchev had a hand in it. The harsh, strident note which he has reintroduced into Soviet policy and actions has chilled Western spirits and reactivated the need to draw together. In these

circumstances the political will to accommodation may triumph over economic resistance.

### French "Grandeur"

The Western camp, however, has one problem that goes beyond mere considerations of economic advantage. The name of that problem is Charles de Gaulle. Thus, although France is a founding member of the European functional communities, and is pledged to honor her commitments, it has become increasingly evident in recent months that de Gaulle has little sympathy with the integrationist movement. As long as he remains at the helm, such French cooperation as is offered to Western Europe and the United States will be based on the classic concept of national sovereignty. A policy devoted to "grandeur" can hardly take any other position.

De Gaulle gave a concrete illustration of his point of view when he repudiated France's agreement to place one-third of its Mediterranean fleet at the disposal of Nato in the event of war, when he forced the deployment of 200 American fighter-bombers to Nato bases outside France, when he refused to permit the stationing of intermediate ballistic missiles on French soil, and pressed instead for a French nuclear striking force. Yet it would be inaccurate to press this line too far, for de Gaulle did permit the participation of a number of French ships in Nato maneuvers in the late summer and early fall of 1960, and he has permitted a limited agreement on unifying Europe's air defense. Furthermore, the French can say, and with justice, that the other members of the European community have been reluctant to accept supranational directives when those directives clashed with important national interests. It is because these clashes came in the economic sphere that world opinion has not been so conscious of them as it has of the French assertion of independence.

General de Gaulle's stance is interesting in another way, for it highlights the importance of an integrated Europe to the Western bloc. Indeed, the move for European unity was linked from the first to American sponsorship of Nato and European rearmament. For



this reason European neutralists opposed it, although in itself the concept is not necessarily antagonistic to their convictions. In fact, a very good case can be made out that neutralism and European integration are ideologically allied. Certainly the concept of Europe as a third force, a neutral buffer between East and West, would have a greater chance of realization if a single West European state were to emerge. Such a state would be powerful enough to act independently.

At present this development does not seem likely, even though General de Gaulle occasionally acts as if he would like to be the leader of an independent West European bloc. But the operative word here is bloc, and it is difficult to envision the General playing an active role in an organically united Europe. In any event, while we cannot rule out that at some indefinite future time a united Europe might play a largely independent role in world affairs, for such a situation to develop now would mark a signal diplomatic defeat for the United States.

At present, American policy does not provide for any such eventuality. In its planning and operation it is based on the assumption that our European allies will remain loyal to their commitments, and will continue to contribute to the forces of Nato. Yet Nato, while possessing a unified command, relies on national troop contingents as the basis of its strength. It is not a truly supranational body, and as an organization is presumably uninterested in the course of European unity as long as sufficient forces are provided by its members.

Of course this is an oversimplification, for any controversies or disputes arising from the integration movement are intimately bound up with Nato's welfare. Some have urged, both to obviate this difficulty and give the organization new impetus, that Nato itself should become an agency of integration outside of purely military matters. However, these views have not carried the day, and Nato continues to function as an essentially military organization, and not as a foster mother to any new West European state.

However, the states of the European Community are members of Nato, as is Britain.

In fact, those seven states are linked in the Western European Union, whose original purpose was to provide a supranational framework within which German military force could be incorporated into the defense of Western Europe. As events have worked out, it is no longer necessary for this purpose, but serves instead largely to police the limitations on German rearmament imposed by the London and Paris Agreements of 1954. Yet it may be said to represent the rudimentary structure for an integrated military force, should the integration movement ever achieve the objective of a single Western European state.

As matters now stand, the Europe of the Six, plus Britain, form the basic military strength of Nato in the West, together of course with the United States and Canada. Of the 21.33 divisions that are available to the Allied Command on the central front, three are from the United Kingdom, two from France, two from Belgium, two from the Netherlands, and, most revealingly, seven from Germany. Five come from the United States, and one-third of a division from Canada.<sup>7</sup> Of these probably no more than 15 are in position and ready to fight,<sup>8</sup> although German military rejuvenation indicates that more may be ready soon. For years the strategy governing these troops has been embodied in the concept of the shield, which means that they should be of sufficient size to make it impossible for the Russians to mount a full scale attack without requiring reinforcements in advance. The positioning of such reinforcements would alert Nato, which could thus presumably ward off surprise attack. Behind this shield, the Allies mount their nuclear counter blow.

The trouble with this conception is that it lost its validity when the Russians also attained the condition of nuclear plenty. The advent of missiles served to complicate the situation further. America's retaliatory advantage was cancelled. Only an effective "second strike" force, which would provide the United States with sufficient power in being after a Soviet nuclear strike to retaliate

<sup>7</sup> *The Soviet Union and the NATO Powers, The Military Balance*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1960, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Alvin J. Cottrell, "NATO: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Current History*, Vol. 39, No. 229, September, 1960, p. 144.

decisively seemed able to act as a feasible deterrent.

### Nuclear Stalemate

Although originally slow to respond to this changed situation, America is now moving to meet it by pressing the development of the Polaris missile system. Yet it is possible, if not probable, that the Soviets also have missile firing submarines, as they claim. Whether they do or not, it seems plain that the world has once again reached the position of a nuclear standoff. For the nations of Western Europe this highlights their weakness, for without conventional forces to cope with those of the Soviet Union, and without a nuclear capability of their own, they wonder if American resolve would be strong enough to honor its commitments, should the Soviets actually launch a strike aimed solely at them. It is this feeling of nakedness that has led to pressure on the United States to share its nuclear stockpiles with its allies. Some countries, France, for example, want to possess their own independent nuclear deterrent capability. Others would accept a deterrent under Nato control.

From the point of view of European integration, there are advantages and disadvantages in either course. To furnish France with its own independent deterrent might mellow General de Gaulle, and make him more amenable to cooperation with the Europe of the Six, and with the general objectives of the Western alliance. On the other hand, it may well increase centrifugal pressures within Nato. It would certainly add to the so-called "nth country problem." A Nato deterrent, while ostensibly cementing the alliance, would make little difference in

the current situation unless the Nato military commander were free to order its firing without consulting the member governments. More importantly perhaps, it might induce the Russians to endow their Warsaw Pact followers with their own nuclear capability.<sup>9</sup> In any event, from both the military and diplomatic viewpoint, it would probably pay to concentrate on strengthening Nato's conventional forces, to permit a more flexible range of response than is now open to it.

As matters now stand, renewed Russian belligerence is forcing Western military planners and statesmen to re-examine their strategy, not only for the present, but for the coming years. There seems to be renewed recognition of the necessity for Western co-operation, as evidenced by French agreement to let German troops train in France, a situation that would have been unthinkable not too many years ago, and by the proposal which has United States Navy support, for placing a fleet of Polaris submarines under Nato command.

Advocates of European union, both on the scene and in the United States, can be encouraged by these developments, even though they might wish they had come about under other circumstances. However, they serve to point up the intimate relationship between European unity and over-all Western strength. Should the West fail to maintain adequate strength, or should Western strategy fail to prevent nuclear catastrophe, European integration may take a form none of us would care presently to envision.

<sup>9</sup> Allan S. Nanes, "NATO's Strategic Dilemmas," *Current History*, *Ibid.*, p. 137. See also *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Air Edition, April 20, 1960, p. 8.

"There are many diversities, many complexities, many unknowns within this massive problem of the underdeveloped and aspiring nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Again there are no simple answers. Perhaps the recent events in Cuba, not to mention the Congo, have cracked sufficiently wide open our too long held national sense of complacency and superiority toward these countries. . . . The events there tell us plainly that we have ample cause to wake up, to look outward, to raise our sights; ample cause for discontent with misinformation, gilded half-truths, any parochial kind of Americanism. There are other no less volcanic centers of brewing turbulence. We may be sure that they will not go away by our ignoring them or wishfully hoping that the *status quo* will hold forever."—Robert F. Goheen, *President, Princeton University*, in an address delivered on September 18, 1960.

*Noting that "a remarkably uniform pattern of policies emerges from a cursory review of West Germany's postwar history," this specialist believes that Germany "is peculiarly fitted to take a leading part in the European movement."*

# Germany's Role in West Europe

By CARL G. ANTHON

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**D**URING THE recent star session of the United Nations General Assembly it was Khrushchev and his satellite satraps who brought up the German question and who launched the familiar and stereotype charges of planned aggression against the German Federal Republic. The representatives from Poland and Czechoslovakia charged that a spirit of revenge was stalking through Western Germany and was dominating its policies as well as those of Nato. It was none other than Harold Macmillan, leader of a people who had twice been victims of German militarism, who vigorously and unequivocally took up the cudgels on behalf of Adenauer's Germany. West Germany, he pointed out at that meeting, had solemnly pledged herself in 1954 never to resort to force to solve international issues and, specifically, never to attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany by force. His country, he argued, had no cause to approve of German militarism, but a whole people could not be condemned for the sins of the past. Moreover, it was not the German Federal Republic who

had desired rearmament; that was made necessary by the arming of East Germany (the German Democratic Republic) and the presence there of strong Soviet armed forces.

This conspicuous defense of West Germany by an English prime minister was all the more significant in view of the well-known reservations held by many Englishmen regarding the Federal Republic. It marks a new stage in Anglo-German relations that may well have far-reaching results for Germany and Western Europe as a whole. Only a few weeks before, in August, Macmillan had paid a visit to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Bonn to explore the possibilities for bridging the rift between the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and the British-led European Free Trade Area (E.F.T.A.). The meeting was prompted by the new international situation created by the failure of the Paris summit meeting in May and by the resumption of an aggressive line by Soviet Russia. At the same time it was part of a chain of meetings designed to meet the challenge of President de Gaulle's plans for a new type of European community. In fact, for some time the French leader's bid for French hegemony in Western Europe had given Adenauer grave concern and underlined the need for a counterbalancing alignment with Britain.

The Bonn visits of Harold Macmillan may usher in an Anglo-German honeymoon replacing the two-year Franco-German one. It is clear that Macmillan, for reasons of domestic and foreign policies, was convinced of the necessity of a rapprochement between England and the Common Market Six, and he chose Adenauer as partner in the first ex-

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ploratory conversations. Obviously he had confidence in Adenauer's Germany as a reliable partner in the Atlantic Community.

Is this confidence in the new Germany justified? Might not the German people, once they gain in power and influence, reassert their nationalistic energies and aspirations? Might they not try to solve the German question—the reunification of former German territories at least as of 1937—by force, once and for all? How stable, moreover, is democracy in Germany and how popular is the European course set by Adenauer? Might not the retirement of the “old gentleman” from the political scene—which may come in 1961—usher in a period of uncertainty, perhaps of retrogression?

Anxious questions, these, and not easily answered. Certainly they cannot be fully treated within this brief scope. But there are enough indications in the total picture which warrant at least moderate optimism that the federal republic will continue to move along the course set by Adenauer.

For 11 years, the integration of Germany into a united Western Europe has been the cornerstone of Adenauer's foreign policy (and, as in the days of Bismarck, foreign policy dominates over domestic policy). The Nazi regime and two disastrous world wars have taught most Germans the futility of an egocentric nationalism. Thus in 1945, most Germans were ready for Europe, for a new kind of national existence, the more so since their utterly chaotic situation in the early postwar years held little promise for anything else. The rebirth of Germany from the ashes could have a future only in the form of membership in an integrated European community. Chancellor Adenauer therefore stuck tenaciously to his policy of fulfillment and unequivocal cooperation with the Western allies, often in the face of bitter attacks from political opponents, particularly in the ranks of the Socialists.

A recrudescence of French nationalism under de Gaulle at the expense of the German Federal Republic as well as of a genuinely integrated European community could seriously undermine Adenauer's leadership in Germany. The Socialists (S.P.D.), making a strong bid for victory in the 1961 elections with a new program and leadership, may well convince some voters that Adenauer's

steadfast Francophile course was wrong after all. For the sake of his party, the Christian Democrats (C.D.U.), and his own reelection prospects as federal chancellor, if for no other reason, Adenauer must try to stop de Gaulle's romantic and reckless ambitions from wrecking the European Community as it has emerged thus far.

#### De Gaulle's “Design”

Adenauer obtained the first clear indication of de Gaulle's “Grand Design” for Europe during his talks with the French leader—their fifth direct meeting—at Rambouillet at the end of July, 1960. At this secret meeting, precipitously arranged, de Gaulle apparently outlined his plan for a new type of European organization in which the heads of governments, rather than integrated executive agencies, would formulate common policies for Western Europe and perhaps even beyond. The plan envisaged frequent meetings of the heads of governments or their representatives (endowed, of course, with veto powers) and a permanent secretariat in Paris. De Gaulle argued that in view of the apparent inability of the United States to act clearly and firmly on the international scene it was necessary for Western Europe to assert itself as a “third force” *vis-à-vis* the United States and the U.S.S.R.

France, by virtue of her prestige and power, and on the way to becoming an atomic power, was to play the leading role. For the same reason, Britain was to be excluded from the more closely-knit Europe of the Six. At the same time, de Gaulle proposed a reform of Nato to the effect that the defense of Western Europe should be planned on a *national* basis rather than as an integrated defense force under American leadership. Integration, he argued, was the device adopted ten years ago in view of the political, economic, and military weakness of the West European states at that time, when only the United States possessed the means for defending free Europe. In the meantime, with the revival of strength among the European members of Nato, decisive control over their defense should be exercised by themselves.

Thus, de Gaulle envisaged a confederation of “fatherlands” among the Six, led by “La Grande Nation.” In this old fashioned alliance of governments, the three supranational



organizations—the E.C.S.C., E.E.C., and Euratom (European Atomic Community)—already established, would play a minor, purely technical role. It is well known that President de Gaulle is suspicious of the “technocrats” in Brussels and would like to curb their influence and ambitions as far as possible.

Obviously, Adenauer could not go along with these designs which, though deeply rooted in a long tradition of French plans for a united Europe, failed to take due cognizance of the basic realities in contemporary international relations. De Gaulle's efforts to revive his “third force” plan in a new form must alienate both Britain and the United States. For this reason earlier proposals by de Gaulle to establish a Nato triumvirate consisting of France, Britain, and the United States had been rejected by the latter two as well as by the rest of the Six. Moreover, the reduction of the German Federal Republic to the status of junior partner would constitute an impossible liability for Adenauer's government. Not that West Germany wishes to dominate the Six—Bonn has so far refused to ask for the questionable privilege of becoming an atomic power, in accordance with her treaty obligations in 1954—but she cannot accept a situation wherein one nation might exercise an absolute veto in European defense policies.

For that matter, de Gaulle's pretensions are unrealistic, for at present West Germany's economic and military position is stronger than France's. To date, West Germany has built up an army of nine divisions and her full Nato contribution of 12 divisions is expected to be completed in 1961. Specifically, the West German armed forces, as of October, 1960, consisted of 276,000 men, of whom 172,000 were in the army, 64,000 in the air force, 24,000 in the navy, and 16,000 in the frontier defense forces.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, France's military forces are being dissipated in Algeria, thus paralyzing her military position on the European continent. It will take France at least five years to build up a nuclear establishment and that at tremendous cost.

Adenauer's fears of de Gaulle's vagaries were apparently not lessened during the conference at Bonn with French Prime Minister Michel Debré and his foreign minister

Couve de Murville on October 7 and 8, 1960, a conference called to obtain more light on the French leader's ideas. According to press reports,<sup>2</sup> Adenauer referred to de Gaulle's proposal of an independent national defense as “catastrophic” which would drive Germans back to nationalism and neutralism. The conference atmosphere was further aggravated by the arrival of a dispatch reporting de Gaulle's speech in Grenoble in which he had demanded a French veto in the use of the atomic bomb anywhere in the world. “What does this mean,” Adenauer was reported to have exclaimed, “If Khrushchev unleashed his rockets on us, must the allies remain paralyzed until France makes a decision?”

There is no doubt that the hazy, polite conversation in Rambouillet had been followed by plain words in Bonn. Adenauer's position was greatly strengthened by the timely arrival of a letter from President Eisenhower in which the latter indicated that it appeared doubtful that American troops would remain stationed in Europe if the Nato defense forces were broken up into their national components. But despite Debré's efforts to “explain” the meaning of his president's public orations, it is well known that the differences with regard to the future shape of Nato or the European Community remained. The official communiqué<sup>3</sup> merely reiterated the truism that “the Atlantic defense alliance constituted the basis of European defense.” The real urgency of the issue was documented by the fact that a meeting of the six prime ministers or heads of state was scheduled to be held in Paris during December.

It is thus clear beyond doubt that the Bonn government under Adenauer has been steadfastly adhering to the principles of the Atlantic alliance. Adenauer regards the American commitment in Europe as the *sine qua non* of European defense. For this reason, continuing close cooperation with the United States and Britain, whose armed forces are part of the integrated defense forces in Europe, must be the foundation of Adenauer's

<sup>1</sup> The Bulletin issued by the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, October 11, 1960, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Time, October 24, 1960, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine, October 10, 1960.

policy. More integration, therefore, rather than less, both in Nato and in the European Economic Community, continues to be the aim of the Bonn government.

It is true that since last summer Adenauer seems to have had some hesitation about going ahead with the accelerated schedule to establish the European Common Market agreed upon earlier in the year. Shortly before his meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan, Adenauer warned against "rushing" the integration process, thus apparently disavowing his former close associate, Professor Walter Hallstein, president of the E.E.C. Commission and an ardent and energetic champion of accelerated integration. Moreover, in October, the Adenauer cabinet announced its unwillingness to go along with the decision of the E.E.C. Council of Ministers to lower agricultural tariffs by five per cent, a move which threatened to disrupt the whole plan to accelerate the reduction in tariffs. No doubt Adenauer, mindful of the 1961 parliamentary elections, heeded the voice of the agrarian organizations who have been clamoring for protection of their grain prices and who have been opposing the E.E.C.'s plan to control farm prices all along.

But beyond this domestic issue, Adenauer is probably trying to hold back Hallstein's hand in order to give Britain an opportunity to join the E.E.C. in some form before its organization and policies have crystallized beyond a point where Britain's membership would be possible. He has expressed his confident hope that an understanding between the E.E.C. and England will materialize in 1961 and has said that concessions would have to be made on both sides. There are indications that there is a readiness for negotiations on both sides. In England, where, significantly, Peter Thorneycroft, a strong supporter of the Common Market idea, recently returned to the cabinet, the possibility of joining the European Atomic Community and the E.C.S.C. is being studied. German industry has gone on record favoring a European customs union that would include Britain. Very likely the prospects for such a customs union were among the subjects discussed in Bonn by Macmillan and Adenauer. In any case, Chancellor Adenauer has met Macmillan half way by conceding that their governments, not the

E.E.C. Commission, should explore the problem of Britain's relationship with the Common Market, and by indicating that the creation of supranational political institutions among the Six should be postponed.

#### German Support for Adenauer?

It may legitimately be asked to what extent Adenauer's policies reflect the thoughts and wishes of the majority of Germans, and whether or not other governments that will succeed Adenauer's will continue along the same lines. In the past, the chief criticism of his foreign policies, as already noted, have come from the S.P.D. But even the S.P.D. agreed with him on the basic aims—cooperation with the West, European integration, and the eventual reunification of Germany. It merely differed with Adenauer on the methods and procedures, on the very sequence of these objectives, and in the early postwar years adhered to a nationalistic course advocated by its fiery leader, the late Kurt Schumacher. The latter objected to the priority given European integration, contending that it would jeopardize the chances for German reunification. In those days, reunification was still conceivable, whereas today its prospects have receded to the distant future.

In conformity with these and other basic changes in the German scene, the Socialist party has recently made necessary adjustments, modifying its doctrine and program and refurbishing its leadership. At the S.P.D. congress in Godesberg in 1959, the party divested itself of its Marxist ballast and doctrinaire program calling for nationalization of industries, and thus it stands a good chance to broaden its base among the voters. The party's nomination of Willy Brandt, the energetic, young (47) mayor of Berlin, for the chancellorship in 1961, emphasized the need for youthful leadership in Bonn and at the same time put forward a leader whose basic views on foreign policy practically coincided with those of the federal government. Brandt has come out squarely for Nato and for cooperation with the United States, for European political, economic, and cultural integration, and for close cooperation with France and Britain. He accepts military conscription for the Bundeswehr and, if nec-

essary—though reluctantly—nuclear weapons, but, like Adenauer, he opposes Germany's becoming an atomic power.

Thus, the S.P.D. can no longer be represented by Adenauer and the C.D.U. as being opposed to the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. Under Brandt's leadership, the S.P.D. may develop into a kind of liberal party with a progressive political and social reform program to make of the Federal Republic a model democratic state. After spending the war years in Scandinavia, developing his political views and capacities under the aegis of Mayor Ernst Reuter, and learning the art of statesmanship in permanently embattled Berlin, Willy Brandt is a very different type of Socialist leader from the emotional Schumacher or the colorless Ollenhauer, neither of whom were able to win sufficiently broad support for their party. In fact, Brandt is the heir of Reuter, the popular and wise leader of Berlin who, had he lived, might very well have become the leader of the S.P.D. to challenge Chancellor Adenauer.

#### Foreign Aid

The S.P.D. as well as the German labor unions (D.G.B.) also associate themselves firmly behind the government's program for aid to the developing countries. For some time, Bonn has been criticized in Western quarters, especially in official circles in the United States, for allegedly not contributing to multilateral aid programs in proportion to Germany's favorable trade balance and her spectacular foreign exchange reserves. Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard and the president of the German Federal Bank, Karl Blessing, tried to counter these friendly hints at recent meetings of the World Bank in Washington and the International Monetary Fund in New York by pointing out that foreign exchange reserves alone do not prove a country's ability to aid developing countries, and that in any case Germany's trade surplus was rapidly decreasing as her imports were expanding. However, they assured their foreign colleagues of the Federal Republic's genuine concern for foreign aid programs and of its determination to fulfill its obligations in this area. Erhard also noted that more than half of the credits made available to the World Bank during the past

two years had been contributed by the Federal Republic and that, next to the United States, West Germany had been the chief source of the World Bank's new funds. In addition to pledging his government's determination to provide increasing aid to developing countries, Erhard also referred to existing plans to raise one billion deutsche marks (c. \$250 million) in the form of credits from German private enterprise.<sup>4</sup>

In various other ways, Bonn has documented its active interest in the field of foreign aid. A German Academy for Developing Countries, offering technical training to specialists from developing countries, was founded in Berlin in September, 1960. Moreover, the federal government in October announced a pledge to contribute DM22 million (\$5.3 million) to the U.N. Technical Assistance and Special Fund programs, an increase of 56 per cent over 1960. This in spite of the fact that the federal republic is not a member of the United Nations. The announcement by Bonn's affable observer at the United Nations, Dr. Heinrich Knappstein, was well timed to coincide with the presence of representatives from more than a dozen new member nations from Africa where West Germany is intensely interested in expanding its commercial interests. For the same reason, the federal republic is favoring the continuing association with the E.E.C. of new African nations, formerly belonging to the French colonial empire. In this connection, it should be noted that trade missions from Eastern Germany are extremely active in African countries, capitalizing on the world wide reputation of famous German trade names. German firms have been pressuring Bonn to intensify its efforts in this area in order to offset the gains made by the Communist German regime.

Any inquiry into the future prospects of Western Germany as a democratic and reliable member of the Western European community must necessarily extend to the question of a possible recrudescence of nationalism, militarism and racism. Many voices have been heard, both from within

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, September 29, 30, and October 6, 1960.

A more massive request by a U.S. financial mission under Secretary of Treasury Robert B. Anderson, November 21-23, 1960, for an annual German contribution of \$600 million toward the cost of American troops in Western Germany was firmly turned down by Adenauer's government.

Germany and abroad, expressing alarm over recent manifestations of anti-Semitism in Western Germany. It was reassuring to note, that the reaction in Germany, both official and private, was instantaneous and unequivocal, and not only because of concern for the federal republic's prestige abroad (though that was necessarily an important motivation). Besides meting out punishments to the guilty—more than the “sound thrashing” once rather glibly proposed by Adenauer—government agencies adopted various measures for combating the activities and poisonous publications of rightist, neo-fascist, and crackpot groups, for the two young hoodlums caught in the Cologne smearings last year were definitely products of such gutter influences. The ministers of culture in the individual Laender (states) have given further attention to the teaching of recent and contemporary history in German schools where it was admittedly long neglected. A standard textbook on the Nazi era is being prepared, laws against racism are being tightened up, and government lawsuits against Nazi criminals are being prosecuted with vigor.

Thus, the intention to give German youth a better understanding of Germany's recent past is doubtlessly there, but its implementation rests with teachers and professors who, if they belong to the older generation, have been understandably reticent on the subject. But as the younger generation is gaining in experience and influence in education, in the mass media and in politics, the political education of German citizens is being pursued more energetically and effectively. The mass media, youth and church organizations, cultural and scientific groups continue to stress the need for Germans to know and to master their past. Leading newspapers devote a surprising amount of space to critical, introspective articles on Germany's moral and political problems. The bi-weekly documentary programs over the German television networks on the Nazi regime, scheduled for a period of eight months beginning October, 1960, and reaching an estimated audience of ten million persons, should make a tremendous impact.

In this context it should be pointed out that the continuing, large-scale exchange of students, teachers, professors and youth lead-

ers under the German Fulbright and other exchange programs has contributed substantially to a healthy political orientation in Germany. On the whole, German citizens have responded enthusiastically to the presence of American scholars in German institutions, while German exchangees have generally returned to their country imbued with a desire to share their experiences in America with their compatriots and to try wherever possible to apply them to their work in Germany.

Foreign observers have often pointed to the potential danger of the vast number of German expellees and refugees in Western Germany who may some day try to commit their government to a program of redeeming the lost territories east of the Oder-Neisse line or of bringing about the reunification of Germany by force. They point to the existence of strong refugee organizations who at frequent mass rallies reiterate their “right to a homeland.” Naturally the refugees of the older generation cling to thoughts of their “Heimat” but, publicly at least, they repudiate feelings of revenge and any intention to solve this problem by force.

This attitude coincides with the official policy of the federal republic (as well as of the Western allies, with the possible exception of de Gaulle) which has never recognized the Oder-Neisse line as permanent, pending a peace treaty, yet has abjured the resort to force as mentioned above.

But what is the actual attitude of the individual refugee? May he not be emotionally so charged as to be a ready tool or victim in the hands of any determined group of extremists? Aware of this danger and in order to test this attitude, a German television program was recently arranged in which Eugen Kogon, the well-known editor of the *Frankfurter Hefte*, interviewed a sample of expellees from the trans-Oder-Neisse territories. However, in spite of the rather pointed questions and statements put to the interviewees, the latter proved to be remarkably stable and realistic with regard to a possible return to their homeland; they unanimously repudiated force as a means of getting there.

The attitude of this particular sample tended to show that the expellees and refugees, although still suffering from the loss of their homes and longing for a return thither



—under different conditions than now exist —had become assimilated in the West German social fabric. As long as the process of their integration is allowed to continue undisturbed, they constitute no threat to German democracy or to their neighbors. They might, of course, be ready dynamite in the event of a serious economic depression or other calamity, but that would be equally true for many other Germans. The wonder of the refugee problem is that this enormous mass of uprooted, destitute humanity has been integrated into the body politic of the federal republic in an efficient, fair and orderly manner. It is a miracle almost more spectacular than the so-called economic miracle which has hypnotized the minds of so many people in Germany and abroad.

Another category of refugees—from the Communist German Democratic Republic—is still pouring into the federal republic, a constant reminder to West Germans of the plight of their compatriots east of the Elbe river as well as of the smoldering Berlin problem. This refugee stream has risen in recent months to 15 thousand–20 thousand a month, showing that the pressures of the Communist regime are certainly not lessening. Most refugees flee by way of West Berlin, and this is one more reason why Khrushchev and his puppet regime in East Berlin are so anxious to “normalize” the status of Berlin. Recent restrictive measures by that regime to control traffic between East and West Berlin are designed to undermine the position of free Berlin.

To emphasize the seriousness of this new threat, Bonn retaliated by serving notice on the “interzonal” trade agreement which thus expires by the end of 1960 unless renegotiated. This was a fairly drastic measure, risking, in fact, still more drastic Communist countermeasures such as possibly another Berlin blockade. Bonn’s resolute gesture was greeted by the East German population (largely anti-Communist) as a welcome sign of energetic resistance to Communist harassment, even though the measure may mean more economic privations for them. No doubt Bonn hoped by this action to commit other Western nations to an embargo against

the G.D.R., as well as to mobilize Western support for defending the status quo in Berlin. But it is also true that this strong policy has the support of the great majority of West Germans, including the business circles.

Economically, the interzonal trade is small in volume and of little importance either to Bonn or to business, but politically it is held to be of some significance since it constitutes one of the few remaining bonds between the two halves of the fatherland. If the Socialists should come to power in 1961 and Willy Brandt becomes chancellor there is every reason to believe that the government’s policies with regard to Berlin and East Germany will be more vigorous than has allegedly been the case—according to his critics—with Chancellor Adenauer and his colleagues.

A remarkably uniform pattern of policies emerges from a cursory review of West Germany’s postwar history. The uniformity was imposed, to be sure, not only by the stable leadership of Konrad Adenauer, but even more so by the immovable problems and forces of the cold war. Fortunately, Bonn’s policies are not merely negative in character, not merely anti-Soviet or anti-Communist, but they are motivated by the positive desire on the part of its leaders to orient the new Germany toward a new Europe. The ultimate aim of Germany’s organic integration into a Europe of six or more nations has the support of her political parties and labor unions, her industry and above all her youth.

Because Germany has lost her national identity through past catastrophes, she is peculiarly fitted to take a leading part in the European movement. Her statesmen and her representatives in the European organizations have played a decisive role in furthering the cause of European integration. In all this she has had the blessing and the effective support of the United States who hoped thereby to accelerate the measures for European and Western defense. While it is entirely conceivable that the paternal regime of the “old gentleman” will be replaced in the near future, the basic problems, and therefore, the basic foreign policies of the country will remain essentially unchanged.

Pension funds in private industry in the U.S. total about \$45 billion and are growing at the rate of \$4 billion a year.—*A Twentieth Century Fund Study.*

*Writing of France, this author notes that "the crux of the regime's instability at home and unsucess abroad [is] its failure to solve the problem of North Africa, and the problems which the army of North Africa now poses in French politics: France would like Nato support on Algeria, but "this is not a price most Europeans are willing to pay."*

# The French View of Europe

By EUGEN WEBER

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THERE are 40 million subjects in France, wrote a pamphleteer of the nineteenth century, not counting the subjects of dissatisfaction. There are several million more French subjects today, but the subjects of dissatisfaction remain countless. They certainly seem no fewer than on May 13, 1958, when rebellion in Algiers, indifference and indecision in Paris, ushered in one more republic—Fifth of that name—destined to solve the problems of order, authority and national unity which its predecessors had found insoluble.

The new Republic had a prestigious getter: Charles de Gaulle, who presided over the making of its Constitution and became first president of a state geared to his specifications; a presidential regime intended to avoid the governmental instability, parliamentary anarchy, and executive impotence that had played an important part in the collapse of the Fourth Republic. But de Gaulle was not the only guest at a christening where many had scarcely laid aside the lethal weapons they had used or, mostly, threatened to use a little while before; and where the

sacristy echoed to the heavy clomp of parachutists' boots. The Fifth was held over the font by Michel Debré, who had been one of the most eloquent advocates of violence before its coming, and who had not hesitated to use it, or encourage others to use it, against his political opponents. Michel Debré became de Gaulle's first prime minister, and he is prime minister still. But the accession of the Fourth's chief plotters to the Fifth's seats of power could not put an end to plots. It was merely an indication that violence and plotting, having proved successful, had increased their range and the ransom of success. Recurrent explosions, verbal and other, reminded the public that the cat's cradle of conspiracy had not dissolved, but merely shifted from the opposition to the governmental team.

This was natural enough: not all the rebels and conspirators had come to Paris or to power in 1958. When they saw that de Gaulle had called to work with him the pusillanimous members of governments they had risen to discard, when they saw their erstwhile comrades, softened by the corrupting influence of power, trying to develop policies instead of prejudices, those who had stayed in Algiers (in spirit or in fact) felt let down or double-crossed. Encouraged by highly-placed friends in the services, police, administration and in Parliament, they took up once more the underground activities that had paid off so well. And on several occasions, notably over the barricades of January, 1960, trials of strength opposed the hence-divided allies of 1958.

It is no longer possible to ignore what many insisted on ignoring at the time: that

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the Algerian riots of January last were a defeat for the government. The latter had to negotiate secretly with the rioters' military protectors, and saved its face only at the cost of important private concessions whose tenor has since been revealed in the failure of all talks with the F.L.N. That public opinion in the metropolis backed the General wholeheartedly is irrelevant. And this irrelevance reflects the fact that, for the moment, public opinion has little say in affairs decided above its head and, more than usual in so-called democracies, without its knowledge.

The parties and the politicians that had led or expressed opinion in the past are either divided and discredited still by the feuds and failures of 1958, or continue loyal to a majority which alone, in their eyes, can ensure stability and sense. The Communists are still distrusted by their left-wing neighbors. The Mollet Socialists (S.F.I.O.), who have just decided to go into opposition, have not been forgiven for supporting de Gaulle. The Independent Socialists (P.S.U.) of Gaston Defferre and Pierre Mendès-France are few and appeal mostly to students and intellectuals. The Catholic Democrats (M.R.P.), represented in the cabinet, begin to straggle away from a majority that threatens their basic aim of European union. Only Gaullists (U.N.R.) and some of the Independents—less independent than others—hold steadfast in spite of disagreements, persuaded that compromise is preferable to chaos and that de Gaulle alone can preserve the country from the military *coup d'état* it barely escaped in May, 1958.

Indeed, the long quiescence of the Left (which today begins to stir under the impulse of students, intellectuals and unionists) and the forthcomingness of moderates, from Mollet to Mauriac, from Reynaud to Mendès, would make no sense without the ominous presence of the soldiers. The army alone has the cohesion, the force, and the philosophy of power developed during long years in the wilderness, to impose a will that almost every section of parliamentary opinion dreads. Though seldom used openly (as François Mauriac does every week in *l'Express*), the strongest argument of de Gaulle's supporters is that he is the only alternative to a pretorian *putsch* and some kind

of "fascist" regime. It seems that even the Communists have found the argument convincing.

### Unity and Destiny

The unity de Gaulle strives for is not exactly, certainly not only, the sort of unity expressed by popular suffrage or, least of all, by majority rule. The country, he seems to think, cannot be united in terms of political parties, still less of programs and ideologies. It must be united behind a sort of charismatic leadership, to fulfill the manifest destiny that can be discerned in the historical tradition and the enduring reality that is France. One of the incarnations of this reality is de Gaulle, another is the Army. This being so, there can—there must—be no conflict between the General and the generals. And it is very clear that, well aware of the tensions and soul-searchings that divide the army, the General wants to avoid any situation that would pit soldier against soldier and split once more a body he has split before—in 1940.

There is no understanding de Gaulle without the realization that he is haunted by the memory of 1940–1944, and determined to avoid the kind of rift which he was once—bravely, unwillingly, but necessarily, instrumental in creating. The General is no dictator, nor does he want to be. He seems to see himself rather as a pedagogue, his task as one of guidance and gradual education, leading the French towards a common goal they must be taught to discern and accept—together. Rebels must not be rejected from the community, especially when their rebellion stems from honorable, patriotic motives, but they must be given the reassurance and attention that will bring them to reason. For this purpose, time is of the essence, because time alone can show more soldiers, more colonists, more Frenchmen, that an Algerian settlement, even if it means Algeria's loss, is in France's best interest.

Events have shown such calculation to be correct in part. French opinion is speaking up for peace as it has never done before and, even in Algeria, more colonists than ever begin to come round to the idea. But time which, in this respect, works for de Gaulle, also works against him. His opponents organize; his friends are discouraged by the

tortuous subtleties of a policy where two steps forward are less obvious than one step back; both on the Left and Right supporters lose confidence and leave his camp. Meanwhile, in Algeria, six years of killing and rapine are leaving a legacy of hatred on all sides that diplomacy will not find easy to dispel.

The critics of France tend to forget that the Arab F.L.N. also, and more so, is bloody and violent and unjust; that it murders, mutilates, burns, destroys, and that it numbers among its victims far more Muslims than it does Frenchmen. No side has the monopoly of injustice and of blood. But what the French are blamed for (and their most numerous and articulate critics can be found in France) is that being "on our side," the side of freedom and justice, as we like to think, they have chosen to use the methods of the other. They claim to defend the West but, in the process, become like the enemy against which they defend it.

Yet tortures and prisons and murders and camps are no longer a matter of choice, it seems, in war and, especially, in civil war. That soldiers in fear of ambush and civilians in fear of their lives and for their life's work should torture and imprison, is an almost necessary result of the kind of conflict Algeria has imposed. Only the end of war can put an end to torture. And when the issues and the *mores* of the civil war begin to spread to France, time is running short if de Gaulle wants to avoid the installation of Algerian methods and conditions at home. Already justice limps and the press, long-muzzled at Algiers, finds its freedom threatened in Paris. And though radio and television are dull and faithful echoes of the master's voice, talk of fresh plots and counter-plots has filled the air for months.

All of this has a very definite bearing on France's position, not only in Western Europe but in the world. It was the Algerian issue that led de Gaulle to attack the "so-called United" Nations and ignore its possibilities just when the French-speaking African states admitted to its counsels offered great opportunities for effective action. It is the Algerian issue that poisons relations with these otherwise-Francophile African communities. And it is, in part, the Algerian

issue that haunts French relations with allies torn between the desire to placate Afro-Asia and the need not to lose a Nato partner.

As Suez and Cyprus, Congo and North Africa have shown, Nato's great problem is that a community of interests in Europe does not imply a community of interests elsewhere. This has become increasingly clear as the cold war has shifted its sights; and the French (like the Belgians) have learned that their partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have divergent policies in Africa. At the same time, American pre-presidential election doldrums have come to demonstrate what everybody knew already, but what had never occurred at such a crucial time, that during such periods the Americans have no particular or effective foreign policy at all. This persuaded de Gaulle that, if the United States is, for the moment, a necessary ally, such recurrent sabbaticals of political incoherence and diplomatic paralysis make it an unreliable leader. The great powers of the West should develop a policy of their own, cease being America's echo.

Of course, this was only one of many aspects of an attitude whose basic purpose is, as it always has been, the affirmation of French greatness and independence and power; a purpose which, de Gaulle tells us in his *Memoirs*, had already led him in 1944 to decide "if necessary to contract on one side or another whatever alliances should prove necessary, without ever accepting any kind of dependence."

A sentence like this is a whole program, essential to understanding French policies between 1944 and 1946, as between 1958 and 1960. It explains a policy that accepts the United Nations as long as it does not interfere with French interests but denounces it as soon as it attempts to intervene in French affairs that don't concern it. It explains the emphasis of the Little Europe of the Six against the looser and less reliable arrangements of American-dominated Nato. It also explains the recent attempts to develop means of independent action which, the French hope, will enable them to stand alone if they have to, and to pursue the policy they choose instead of accepting compromises imposed by outsiders with different interests and points of view. Its results can be judged



in a glance at France's military situation and plans.

#### France's Military Position

The necessities of Algerian warfare have sucked away most of the troops France was supposed to keep in Europe under her Nato obligations: instead of 14 French divisions in Germany there are two, badly equipped and poorly armed, according to recent statements of their commanding general. The concern for prestige channels billions badly needed by conventional troops, or better still in other sectors of the national economy, towards production of atomic weapons destined, it would seem, to remain as symbolic as they are costly. The atomic devices France possesses today would have to be sent to the enemy by train. The jet-powered *force de frappe* it hopes to possess tomorrow will be equally out of date by the time it is ready in the late 1960's. And the army, brave and battle-hardened as it is after 21 years of uninterrupted war, may, after its long experience of guerilla warfare, prove as unprepared for modern combat as Bazaine's troops did in 1870.

All this has come under heavy criticism from "Europeans" who fear that independence for France means a slow-down in the economic and political integration of Western Europe, and from "patriots" uneasy at a growth of German power which the need to invest men, material and money in North Africa serves to emphasize. African involvement means, in effect, absence from Europe. And France's European absence weighs heavily on her European plans. Independent action means ineffective action. And this ineffectiveness is too apparent not to affect the judgment of observers.

There is also specific criticism of the heavy investments proposed for the *force de frappe*. The bill Parliament is asked to pay, or decide the French will pay, amounts to 600 billion francs, \$120 billion. Industry could use this capital; and it could use the scarce scientists and the technicians that this grand and perhaps useless project would employ. For, while France's economic situation is good, it is less brilliant than it was in 1957 and less dynamic than that of her partners and competitors in the Common Market.

Industrial production continues to expand (a seven-eight per cent increase is expected in 1960 over 1959); but the rate of expansion, lower than in 1957, last year of the defunct Fourth, is half that of German industry and just over one third that of the Italians.

And meanwhile, much other capital that could help remedy this state of affairs is being poured into the creation of an Algerian industrial and economic structure which is supposed to justify French rule and good intentions but which may or may not continue as part of the nation's property and potential. Nor is it doubtful that if the country could reduce the proportion of national revenue devoted to military expenses from the present 12 per cent (Algeria again!) to something like the Germans' 7 per cent, more capital would become available for investments either in industry or in sectors which, like agriculture, are crying (and sometimes striking) out for reform.

As far as the government is concerned, however, better is the enemy of good enough. There is plenty of planning for economic reform, but little doing. France modernizes her economy in a liberal climate: freedom for small enterprises to go out of business, freedom for the great to command the market, freedom for the State to interfere on behalf of those influential enough to enlist it and to regulate those too weak to resist. Official attention, however, is concentrated on international affairs which, as the General has always made clear, are the most fitting occupation of statesmen.

In this field, the developments of 1960 have not improved the understanding between France and her friends. The essence of the French position was presented on May 30, 1960, when, commenting on the failure of the Summit Conference, de Gaulle referred to "the necessity of that Western Europe, once the dream of the wise and the ambition of the strong, today an indispensable condition of world stability"—a necessity which could be achieved by "the organized cooperation of States, pending the eventual development of an imposing confederation."

#### European Confederation

Once again, a supreme stylist had put his main points in a nutshell: confederation, not

integration; at the governmental level, not at any more popular or ideological one. In the new Europe, as in the new Nato, the nation would remain the basic unit. Governments should concert for common action; soldiers should fight each for his country and not for some supranational ideal; relations, economic and other, should be arranged by government-appointed delegates in committee, not by supra-national bodies with velleities of independence, like the European Coal and Steel Community or Euratom.

These, in very general terms, were de Gaulle's ideas in 1950 as in 1960; and these were the ideas he was forced to abandon before the opposition of his Little European allies, afraid of shaking Nato, unwilling to offend the United States or endanger already-established European institutions like E.C.S.C., suspicious of French nationalism (which has played its part in the recent revival of German nationalism), unwilling to drift too far from Britain and the Outer Seven.

In October, 1960, Prime Minister Debré declared at Metz that the government approves the continuation of European integration, notably on the economic plane and, indeed, that it looks forward to this continuation "with our aid and with our will to succeed." The words must have tasted bitter in the mouth of a notorious opponent of integration like Debré, but it would soon appear that even his reassurance had not sufficed to calm the fears of France's partners, or restore confidence between the once-so-close partners of Little Europe and, in particular, between Paris and Bonn.

The fundamental objection to the French proposals, the eventual suspicion of their sincerity, rested less upon detailed objections than upon the profoundly false situation created by France's Algerian difficulties. Even half-hearted acceptance of Europe called for a price. As Debré declared on October 13, to the applause of the National Assembly: "In Algeria, France defends the West. . . . Yet our efforts are not supported by Western solidarity. The fact that [Nato]

does not apply to the whole world is a great cause of weakness." In other words, Nato should support France in Algeria. This is not a price most Europeans want to pay.

Of de Gaulle's proposed allies, none want to be embroiled in colonial conflicts which do not concern them. None want to exchange the French dream of power for the reality of American support. Here we return again, at least in part, to the crux of the regime's instability at home and unsuccess abroad: its failure to solve the problem of North Africa, and the problems which the army of North Africa now poses in French politics. The 600 thousand men poised in Algeria could brush away the existing order as easily as they could roll up the Arab world from Casablanca to Cairo (and start the next war). They might well do either.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, the growing uneasiness and agitation express but do not fill the need for another policy, another program, another ideal that a majority of Frenchmen can accept. Failing this, only the suspect siren-song of communism can rise against the forceful patriotic and social doctrines of ambitious generals.

All of this still revolves around one man, admired, criticized, loved, hated and apparently irreplaceable. But the fact that no one knows what France would do without him, that no one seriously suggests another who could take his place, reflects de Gaulle's essential failure. A Constitution made to measure, a government handpicked for obedience and discipline, a country that is just beginning to lose confidence in his genius, a press and radio that echo government directives, timid and accommodating unions, Communists who have not even begun to stir, political parties disorganized, silenced or admiring, overwhelming public support, a reasonably healthy economy, all these have not enabled the General-President to find or impose a solution to the problem that brought down the Fourth Republic, and to put France on her feet again.

If France was sick in 1958, she is not fundamentally better now. A situation which turns around the presence of one man is not a healthy one, for, sooner or later, men cease to be. Then what? De Gaulle has done nothing to solve this.

The Fourth Republic fell because, faced

(Continued on p. 46)

<sup>1</sup> The army, in this context, means, of course, the officer corps; better still its *activist* minority. Even this is divided between what we might call national-socialists and national-reactionaries: the former, and far more numerous, being for radical reforms, planning and technocracy; the latter looking for inspiration and support to certain Catholic organizations, to Franco, and to the vestiges of American McCarthyism.

*What is Spain's position in West Europe? As this specialist points out, "the character of the Franco regime is a diminishing but still powerful source of discord between Spain and West Europe."*

# Spain's Role in Europe

By ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

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CONTRARY to the age-old cliché that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees," Spain has been an integral part of Western Europe — culturally, economically, politically — throughout modern times. But Spaniards are Europeans with a difference, and the difference begins with geography. The Iberian peninsula not only forms the south-western tip of the larger peninsula of Europe but is in fact somewhat isolated from the rest by the rugged Pyrenees. Spain is thus peripheral to Europe and for long periods her position has directed a large part of her attention and energy away from Europe towards Africa, America and even Asia (the Philippines). In addition, there is in fact a cultural sediment still remaining from the centuries-long domination of most of Spain by the Moors. And in our own times another divisive factor has appeared which, though with diminishing strength, is still a major source of discord. This is the Franco regime.

## I

Spain's relations with her European neighbors have been out of joint ever since the beginning of the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939. Although the maladjustment has been economic and cultural as well, its hard core has been political. All the other difficulties go back to the way in which Spain's present ruler, General Francisco Franco, waged and won that war with the aid of Hitler and Mussolini, and to the dictatorial character of the regime that he established and still maintains. It is a fiercely anti-Communist regime, but it is also avowedly hostile to freedom and democracy as these are known in Western Europe.

As a consequence of the nationalistic and quasi-totalitarian character of the Franco regime, its peculiar political orientation gave it what may be loosely described as an anti-European bias just after World War II. This antagonism was cordially and almost unanimously reciprocated by Spain's European neighbors. Her relations with them reached an all-time low at this time. Spain had hardly a friend in the world and was excluded from the United Nations by general agreement, but her regime's most determined critics were—and still are—her European neighbors, and the bed rock of their animus is still political.

For reasons that will appear below, Spain has sought for more than a decade to rehabilitate herself internationally, both in general and particularly in Western Europe. She was at last admitted to the United Nations in 1955, and to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1959. But she has never yet gained membership in

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any European regional organization of a political character. Her rehabilitation will not be complete until she has been admitted to Nato, and what keeps her out of that is European antagonism based on political grounds.

In her bilateral relations with the West European nations Spain has been more successful. In this she has been fortunate, for they are in every way the most important group of nations in the world to her. They account for 60 per cent of her foreign trade even now, despite the artificial and transient stimulus that the United States bases-and-aid program has given to its trade with Spain. Great Britain, West Germany and France are far in the lead in this respect. Politically, tradition combines with economic interest and considerations of security to give these three countries and Italy a high rating in Spain's scale of values. Even little Portugal has been important because it is contiguous and because Dictator Salazar has been Franco's faithful friend ever since Civil War days, and at times his only friend.

Culturally, Spain is still oriented towards her neighbors north of the Pyrenees, especially France, Germany and England. Italy trails them, but is not negligible. Militarily, West Europe is of course eclipsed by the United States as a consequence of its bases agreement of 1953 with Spain, but this has a time limit and no one regards it as likely to become permanent.

One of the best measures of Spain's success in her quest for rehabilitation is provided by the Nato problem, which will be discussed below. It may be noted here, however, that her success has been minimal in the Scandinavian countries and greatest in the Germany of Adenauer and the France of de Gaulle. Even in the two latter cases the success has not been overwhelming. Something like a *rapprochement* has taken place, and yet on the part of Paris and Bonn there is still a certain air of reserve towards Madrid. Despite their fondness for heads-of-state meetings, neither de Gaulle nor Adenauer has ever had a personal meeting with Franco.

As for Great Britain, its Conservative government is not hostile to Franco, as is the British Labor party, but neither has it effected a *rapprochement* with him. And

Britain's close economic ties with Spain through trade and investments are offset by the perennial Gibraltar controversy. Italy is Spain's political rival in the Mediterranean as well as her trade rival in the markets of West Europe, and the Franco regime looks askance at a country in which the principal political groups are Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists, for the Spanish counterparts of these three parties are the chief trouble-makers for Franco on the home front.

## II

The two central questions in Spain's European relations today are those raised by her candidacy for membership in Nato and by the stabilization-and-austerity program that she adopted in July, 1959. Highly important in themselves, these two questions bring to a focus many other subsidiary problems, such as those arising out of Spain's relations both with individual European governments and with the recently formed subregional groups, the European Common Market (Inner Six) and the European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven).

I said above that the character of the Franco regime is a diminishing but still powerful source of discord between Spain and Western Europe. The Nato question provides the best illustration. When Nato was established, the only country (so far as we can learn) that favored Spain's inclusion in it was Portugal, ruled by dictator Salazar, Franco's friend from Spanish Civil War days. In 1957, however, the United States came out publicly in favor of Spain's admission and Adenauer's West German government quickly followed suit. In April, 1959, de Gaulle's year-old government at Paris did likewise; and this was the most striking change of all, for de Gaulle's first administration, at the close of World War II, had taken the lead in ostracizing Franco and seeking to unhorse him by economic sanctions.

On the other hand, opposition to Spain's admission is still strong. It includes at least two governments—Denmark and Norway—and possibly Belgium too. It also includes the largest minority parties in France and West Germany as well as in Great Britain, where the Conservative government's stand is non-



committal. Its chief strength is derived from Socialist and labor union groups.

No solution of this question by rational debate seems feasible, since the opposing sides base their arguments on mutually exclusive *a priori* assumptions. Those who favor Spain's admission argue that the Communist threat to the West is basically military, that Nato's function is to meet this military threat, and that the admission of strongly anti-Communist, strategically located Spain would add to the military strength of Nato.

On the other hand, the opponents of Spain's admission regard Communist aggression as unlikely in a military form but certain to be pressed on the political and economic level; they point to the fact that Nato is solemnly committed to safeguarding the principles of democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law; and they maintain that since Franco's government flouts these principles, Spain's admission to Nato would destroy Nato's claims to the allegiance of decent people and thus weaken the defenses of the West against communism. Moreover, they add, as the virtual ally of the United States under the bases agreement of 1953, Spain is already making its maximum contribution to Western defense.

Since Spain already has this tie with the United States, and has found it highly beneficial, why does she wish to join Nato? While, officially, she has never been an active candidate, there can be no doubt that she would like to join, and the explanation is two-fold. First, the prestige of membership would strengthen Franco's hand at home and abroad. Secondly, if Spain were admitted, her military forces would presumably be employed by Nato and would certainly have to be brought up to Nato standards; and since her own government could not foot the bill, it could reasonably expect the principal Nato powers to do so. This would please the Spanish armed forces, which are the chief support of the Franco regime.

Some such shot in the arm is needed as compensation for the loss in 1956 of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, which for nearly half a century had been the special preserve of Spain's armed forces. Most of the present generation of higher army officers, including Franco himself, carved out careers

for themselves in Morocco. Now that it is gone, and the remainder of Spain's possessions in Africa are threatened by the growing ferment throughout the length and breadth of that continent, what possible equivalent is there but membership in Nato?

The need for an alternative was demonstrated in the winter of 1959-1960 by the sudden dimming of Spain's Nato prospects, which from early 1957 had seemed to grow steadily brighter as first Washington, then Bonn, and finally Paris came out publicly on Spain's side. What dimmed them was the revelation, first denied and then admitted, that secret negotiations were going on between Bonn and Madrid for the establishment of German military facilities in Spain. Communists and others alleged that the facilities included rocket bases, which West Germany was prohibited from establishing on her own soil.

On the most favorable construction, this incident gave great offense to many West Europeans because of the secrecy and bilateral character of a negotiation that affected the whole Nato community and which, though known to some of its members, had not been made known to others and had not been cleared through proper Nato channels. Worst of all for Spain, the revelation revived a bitter memory that has been one of the chief impediments to the political rehabilitation of the Franco regime in Western Europe—the memory of that regime's affiliation with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. As a result, Spain's Nato candidacy suffered a setback from which it has not yet recovered.

Whether as an alternative or as a supplement to Spain's admission to Nato, there has been much discussion for more than a decade of the creation of a Mediterranean regional alliance. In its most familiar form, that of a Western Mediterranean Pact, the project has from time to time been endorsed by most of the powers concerned, including France both in the closing months of the Fourth Republic and since de Gaulle's return to power. Spain advocated it warmly until her Nato prospects brightened. In April, 1959, when these were entering their brightest phase, General Franco told me that he had lost interest in the project. Now that the Nato outlook has become less promising, the Mediterranean pact may recover its former appeal. But it

will hardly become feasible until the present turmoil in North Africa is quieted by a generally acceptable settlement of the Algerian question.

### III

The stabilization program adopted by Franco's government in July, 1959, represented a sweeping change of economic policy from nationalistic autarky to orthodox liberalism. It had many broad purposes, some immediate, others long-range. Among the former, it was designed to obtain foreign aid in averting national bankruptcy, which threatened as a result of unsound economic policies pursued over a long period, and in placing the national economy on a sound footing by stabilizing prices, the international balance of payments, and the value of the peseta through a combination of economic liberalization and austerity. It was recognized that the program would at first have a deflationary effect, but it was expected that in the long run the adoption of sound policies would greatly strengthen the Spanish economy, improve its competitive position with a view to expanding its foreign trade, and stimulate domestic production and a rise in living standards.

While this comprehensive program contemplates the whole geographical range of Spain's economic relations and was drawn up under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund, it is especially significant for her relations with her West European neighbors. For one thing, it was designed to qualify Spain for promotion from associate to full membership in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The promotion accordingly took place as soon as the program was announced. For another thing, at least in the minds of its Spanish architects, the program was intended to strengthen Spain to meet the threat, or avail herself of the promise—whichever it might turn out to be—implicit in the formation of two rival subgroups within the O.E.E.C., the Common Market, or Inner Six, headed by France and Germany, and the Free Trade Association, or Outer Seven, headed by Great Britain.

It was unfortunate for Spain that this split among the O.E.E.C. members took place, and especially disappointing that it

developed just before Spain finally gained full membership in that body. Just as she did so in 1959, she found herself once more on the outside looking in—only now she is outside two bodies instead of one. She can hardly afford to join either of them, and yet neither can she afford to remain outside both. Since they include all her principal trading partners except the United States, and most of her competitors, she stands to lose either way. The experts all agree that it will be at least a decade before the Spanish economy will be able to stand up to the competition involved in membership in the Common Market. There is no such impediment to her joining the Free Trade Association, but her principal trading partners, which are also her two new-found political friends—West Germany and France—belong to the Common Market. As a result, if the incipient rivalry between the two groups continues to develop, she may find herself caught in a tight squeeze.

It now appears that Spain may derive aid and comfort in this dilemma from the creation in 1960 of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The new body not only replaces the O.E.E.C. with a larger membership and a broader program of activities, but, it is hoped, will help heal the breach between the Inner Six and the Outer Seven. If it does so, it will confer a boon on Spain. The mere prospect that it may do so has already been welcomed by leaders in Spain's banking community as affording their country a breathing spell.

What other effects the change from O.E.E.C. to O.E.C.D. may have on Spain it is difficult to foresee. From Spain's point of view, the principal change in membership involves the United States, which was only an associate member of O.E.E.C. but is a full-fledged member of the new body, and likely to be a guiding spirit in it. Yet the effect of this change on Spain bids fair to be rather limited, since economic relations between the United States and Spain are shaped to so large an extent by their military tie under the bases agreement of 1953 that the establishment of the new multilateral organization will probably make little difference in them.

The broadening of the functions of the new body could make a good deal of differ-

ence to Spain if her economy were sounder and more highly developed, for its chief new function is to be cooperation in the development of Asia and Africa. But since Spain has the lowest standard of living in West Europe, except for Portugal, her role in this aspect of the O.E.C.D.'s program can be only a very minor one for years to come. She still stands in need of help in the development of her own economy. Hence for Spain the chief significance of the shift from O.E.E.C. to O.E.C.D. is likely to continue to lie in the new organization's contribution to checking the growth of group rivalries and trade discriminations among Spain's principal trading partners in Western Europe.

#### IV

Spain's efforts to improve her relations with Western Europe have had constant encouragement from the United States in the interest of the defense of the West against Communist aggression and as a prelude to Spain's admission to Nato. Pressed by the Franco regime for the reasons of prestige, security and economic benefit already indicated, these efforts were rewarded with a substantial though limited measure of success until a large part of the gain was wiped out by the revelation of the military negotiations on foot between Madrid and Bonn in the winter of 1959-1960.

Whether the lost ground will be regained, or whether the setback will prove permanent for the duration of the Franco regime, depends to a large extent on the way in which the Spanish stabilization program launched in July, 1959, works out. One reason for its dependence is the obvious one that the adoption of the plan signified Spain's determination to make the necessary economic reforms and sacrifices to adapt her economic system to that of Western Europe. Hence the failure or abandonment of the plan would be taken as proof that the Spain of the present regime was either unable or unwilling to carry through a genuine economic reunion with Europe.

But there are also other reasons, which extend beyond the limits of economic fact and appraisal into the realm of political assumptions, estimates and values. And here we must first of all take account of the fact that

European views of the situation in Spain, though differing among themselves, differ still more widely from those prevalent in the United States. Perhaps because they live next door to it, Europeans are less inclined to overlook the Franco regime's past affiliation with Nazi-fascism or the contradiction between its present dictatorial character and the professed democratic aims of Nato. They have less confidence in the regime's dependability and durability. They are also much less impressed by Franco's bargaining power, for they are well aware that his alignment with the West is a matter not of choice but of necessity, since for him, circumscribed as he is, neutralism would be ruinous and pro-communism suicidal.

Consequently, even among the most hard-boiled realists, European judgments of the Franco regime's performance are more exacting. At present the test is provided by the stabilization plan. If that proves an unqualified success, the regime may and probably will gain strength at home, but as regards Western Europe at large it will only recover the dubious position it held before the economic crisis that forced it to submit to the surgery of stabilization. From that position it will have to resume its slow and uncertain climb towards rehabilitation in a skeptical Europe.

To mention only one of the chief factors of uncertainty in its climb, Franco Spain's European position would be adversely affected by almost any conceivable change of administration in either France or Germany, both of which are now governed by highly personal regimes under aging leaders; and the return of the British Labor party to power would likewise be adverse to it.

But the success of the stabilization program is by no means assured. On the contrary, after the initial but partial success already noted, the program bogged down as its deflationary effects and austerity features brought on a domestic recession and a surge of unrest. In the face of these new troubles, the authorities gave such evident signs of divided counsels and wavering will that by the summer of 1960 the Madrid wags were saying, "What this country needs is a strong government."

It is now clear that there are two alterna-

*(Continued on p. 39)*

"Italy is at last in motion," writes this observer. "There is a youthfulness and vitality which impresses all who know Italy well." Here is a thorough analysis of Italy in 1960, the "intellectual ferment" and the "economic resurgence."

# Italy: A Century of Unity

By WILLIAM C. ASKEW  
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IN 1961, the free world will celebrate 100 years of Italian unity.<sup>1</sup> Countless speakers and writers will praise the virtues of a proud and gifted people and will rejoice at the progress which a century of hard work has brought.<sup>2</sup> It should also be a time for reflection on Italy's mission in a troubled world, on those factors which make Italy a great nation, and on the unfinished business at hand. Such reflection may well bring a deeper appreciation of Italy by friends and allies and a less pessimistic outlook by Italians on the future of their country, but it is certain to emphasize the magnitude of the problems which lie ahead.

One must conclude that Italy's true greatness rests not on the size of Italian armies or the abundance of resources but on the creative genius of the Italian people, on possession of one of the most strategically important areas in the world, and on skillful diplomacy dedicated to the service of peace and to the lofty task of calming the passions of Europe. Italy's most tragic mistakes since unification were the decisions to enter two world conflicts. If the terrible price of World War I was the long night of fascism, a compensation for the ordeal of World War

II is a new opportunity to build an effective democracy out of the wreckage of Fascist ambition. But the scars from two world upheavals and fascism are deep and will remain long after the last physical sign of war has disappeared. The task has been doubly difficult because the same ruling élite which supported fascism has remained near the center of the stage and because fascism destroyed the ability of many Italians to participate effectively in a democracy. What have Italians been doing with this fresh opportunity? How vital is Italian democracy?

Italians will probably long remember 1960 as a year of relative prosperity and grave political crisis in which democratic institutions were threatened but survived. The trouble started when the Liberal party withdrew its support from Premier Antonio Segni's Christian Democratic cabinet on February 21. Three days later, Italy's twentieth post-war cabinet resigned. Not until March 25 did Fernando Tambroni form another Christian Democratic cabinet. It became obvious that this cabinet would not survive when it won a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies on April 8 by only 300 to 293, with twenty-four neo-Fascists and five Monarchists joining 271 Christian Democrats to give the winning margin. Giulio Pastore, minister in charge of the development of South Italy, resigned within an hour. Premier Tambroni and his cabinet resigned on April 11 but on April 23 President Gio-

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<sup>1</sup> The writer acknowledges with gratitude a grant through the Colgate Research Committee of funds from the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation, Inc. for the study of the problems of contemporary Italy.

<sup>2</sup> Italian unity was not complete in 1861. Venice was added in 1866, Rome in 1870, and Trieste and Trentino after World War I.



vanni Gronchi refused the resignation and ordered the cabinet to go before the Senate for a vote of confidence. Tambroni complied on April 27 and was sustained by the Senate. The Tambroni cabinet did not give its final resignation until July 19 and only after widespread civic disorders had broken out in many parts of Italy.

The demonstrations began at Genoa against the holding of a M.S.I. (neo-Fascist) congress at the end of June. The Communists quickly exploited the disorders, and, according to Premier Tambroni, a Communist plan for insurrection was thwarted. The neo-Fascists were not idle. Their supporters threw incendiary bombs at the Russian commercial office and the Communist headquarters in Rome and set fire to the home of a Communist deputy in Ravenna. The tense situation, with violence and bloodshed, supplied the necessary shock treatment to cause Liberals, Republicans and Social Democrats to rally to the support of Professor Amintore Fanfani, who formed Italy's twenty-second post-war cabinet on July 26. This was made up exclusively of Christian Democrats and included former Premiers Segni, for foreign affairs, Giuseppe Pella, as minister of the budget, and Mario Scelba, as minister of interior. It was formed in a grim national emergency but many observers feel that it may have a reasonably long life. For the first time in 13 years the Nenni Socialists (P.S.I.) abstained from voting against the cabinet, as did the Monarchists, now united since 1959 under the somewhat confusing title, Italian Democratic Party. Only the Communists and neo-Fascists oppose the Fanfani government.

### The Fanfani Program

Premier Fanfani leads the left wing of the Christian Democrats. He has submitted what the *Economist* calls "one of the most progressive-looking" programs ever presented to Parliament. He seeks to check monopolies, to modernize the tax system, to reform and decentralize public administration, to help the agricultural laborers, to revise the Fascist penal code under which Italians still live.<sup>3</sup> He will continue development plans

and will push his ten year plan for education. There will be no change in the fundamental lines of Italian foreign policy.

What is the parliamentary situation with which any Italian cabinet must deal, presumably until new elections in 1963? The Parliament which was elected on May 25, 1958, and which will probably have a decisive voice in determining the future of Italian democracy, represents the discordant voices in Italy, for more than 93 per cent of the voters went to the polls. More women voted than men. The parties of the extreme left, Communists and Socialists, won 36.9 per cent of the vote for the Chamber and 36.7 per cent of the vote for the Senate for a total of 224 seats in the Chamber and 97 in the Senate. The Christian Democrats, with 42.4 per cent of the vote, won 273 seats in the Chamber. In the Senate they won 41.2 per cent of the vote and half of the 246 elected Senate posts.

The minor parties which support the Republic, Republicans, Liberals, Social Democrats, and Radicals, won 9.4 per cent of the vote and 45 seats in the Chamber. For the Senate they won 9.7 per cent of the vote and 9 seats. The Monarchists and neo-Fascists gained 9.6 per cent of the vote for the Chamber and 49 seats. They won 15 seats in the Senate with 10.8 per cent of the vote. Small parties make up the remainder of the 596 seats in the Chamber and the 246 elected Senate seats. Thus no party has a majority.

One of the most perplexing political problems in Italy since unification has been the wide gulf between the government and the people, the lack of mutual trust. The governments under the Republic may have narrowed this gulf slightly but they have not eliminated it. The barrier between government and people is in part a legacy of history but it is in large measure the result of the tax structure and the lack of fundamental civil service reform. More than 77 per cent of the taxes were indirect, for example, in 1957, and weighed most heavily on those citizens least able to pay. A large bureaucracy, in part a legacy from fascism, is maintained but the hours are short and the pay is low and in general the system does not encourage maximum efficiency or attract people who are always the most capable. Partial relief came when a 102 billion lire wage increase,

<sup>3</sup> "Fanfani Finds the Unfindable," *Economist*, CXCVI (August 13, 1960), 656.

based on rising living costs, was granted to civil servants in April, 1959.

The extreme left has been a thorn in the side of every Republican cabinet. The Communists are ably led and adequately financed. They are the most active group in grass root politics, are masters at masking their real aims and in making lavish promises. They fan passions, capitalize on the mistakes of others, and claim credit for any reforms.

The Nenni Socialists have been threatening to break their alliance with the Communists since 1956 but many observers question whether it is possible for the Socialists to break the ties which bind the two parties at the local level. Nenni criticized both Togliatti and Khrushchev in 1960. Communist membership is reported to be down to 1.8 million. The greatest danger from the Communists is their effort to establish a kind of state within the Italian state. The vote for the extreme left was greater in 1958 than in any national election since the 1946 vote for the Constituent Assembly.

Failure to implement the Italian constitution has weakened the Italian Republic. Fifteen of nineteen regional governments have not yet been established. The power of the prefect is still great. Penal and military codes are still Fascist and not in harmony with republican institutions.<sup>4</sup> So many of the rights granted in the constitution can be limited by law that the Constitutional Court, finally created in 1955, will have its hands full in safeguarding and securing these rights.

The Christian Democratic party is faction ridden, pulled between its wealthy conservative supporters and its liberal mass following. Many Italians identify Christian Democratic rule with Vatican rule. Anti-clericalism has been rising. Christian democracy has been far from effective in carrying through tax and civil service reform and a comprehensive land reform program, not to speak of the implementation of the constitution. It has failed to catch the popular imagination. But it is easy to overemphasize the *immobilismo* of the Italian government and to forget the many progressive steps which have been taken. The parties which support the Republic have shown a remarkable ability to

unite and respond to challenges when the Republic was threatened.

### Economic Progress

Italy is experiencing a remarkable economic resurgence. Complete figures for 1960 will not be in until long after this paper is published but there are indications that this will be the best year since unification in many fields even though the wheat crop is short and even though serious damage was caused by storms and floods in September. The industrial index stood at 180 (1953 = 100) in June as compared with 158 for the year 1959. Shipbuilding has been in crisis, wholesale prices and the cost of living have been slowly rising. Imports and exports have been increasing. The foreign trade deficit ran to 280 billion lire for the first five months of 1960, indicating a much larger deficit for 1960 than in 1959. By the end of June the internal public debt ran to almost 5,820 billion lire.<sup>5</sup>

There is no *immobilismo* in the economic field. Undoubtedly about five and a half billion dollars in United States economic and military aid between 1945 and 1957 helped stimulate Italy's economic growth but most of the credit belongs to Italian initiative and hard work. Wage increases, which have been more than matched by increased production, have kept ahead of rising living costs, thus promoting a slight improvement in living standards. But many Italians earn little more in a day than their counterparts in the United States earn in an hour or two. Italy's liberal foreign investment law of 1956 makes it easy to transfer earnings and capital and Italy is now attracting substantial amounts of foreign capital. Recently published figures indicate the investment of \$173 million of foreign capital in 1958, \$235 million in 1959, and \$147 million in the first six months of 1960.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile, Italian capital and enterprise spread out to other countries in modest amounts.

A few figures from the now complete 1959 record will illustrate Italy's remarkable forward motion. As compared with 1948, Italy had increased national income by 60 per

<sup>4</sup> Piero Calamandrei and Achille Battaglia discuss these matters in *Dieci anni dopo, 1945-1955* (Bari, 1955), pp. 211-408.

<sup>5</sup> Banco di Roma, *Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy*, XIV (September, 1960), 476-482, 549-571.

<sup>6</sup> *La Stampa*, October 1, 1960.

cent, tripled industrial production, and increased agricultural output by 45 per cent. The lira remained one of the strong currencies of the world and Italy held gold and foreign currency reserves of over \$3 billion. Italy's net national income increased more than 6 per cent over 1958 and reached a figure of \$24,529,600,000 or almost \$500 per capita. Agricultural production was slightly higher than in 1958 but lower farm prices caused a slight decline in the value of the crop. Industrial production increased by more than 10 per cent over 1958. More than two million rooms were constructed. Investments surpassed 1958 by 7 per cent and ran to 3,827 billion lire. Production of electricity was over 48 billion kilowatt hours. Projects went forward for the construction of three electronuclear stations. A center for nuclear studies with a powerful nuclear reactor was opened at Ispra in April, 1959. Italy's merchant marine consisted of over five million tons. In 1959 the gap between imports and exports closed. Imports ran to about 2,088 billion lire while exports were just above 1,809 billion lire. The cost of living advanced 1.8 per cent in a year and was some 14.7 per cent higher than in 1953.<sup>7</sup>

### Agricultural Progress

Agricultural reform and improvement of the South have continued to go forward. Existing laws provide for the division of less than half of the large farms but a good job is being done with this partial program. There is a trend toward mechanization; more than 225,000 tractors were in use in 1959. The *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*, with 2077.5 billion lire to be spent between 1950 and 1965, continues with its vast program to give good water to towns, to build roads, to irrigate and improve the soil, and to build farm houses and food processing plants. The *Cassa* supplies 40 per cent of the funds, with the Banco di Napoli supplying a like amount and other southern banks supplying 20 per cent, for loans to industrialize the South.

Three credit institutions have been established; ISVEIMER for south Italy, IRFIS for Sicily, and CIS for Sardinia. To the middle of 1959 over 163 billion lire had been advanced for 1097 projects. The state gas and oil monopoly, Ente Nazionale Idro-

carburi, is making large investments in the South, including an oil refining center at Gela, exploitation of the methane gas discovered at Ferrandina, and a nuclear power plant at Latina.<sup>8</sup> The institution which operates state owned enterprises, I.R.I., is also investing in the South and is building a steel mill at Taranto and a nuclear power plant on the Garigliano river.<sup>9</sup> The "Green Plan" has been advanced to spend 550 billion lire in developing agriculture all over Italy between 1960 and 1965. Still another plan, the "12 Year Plan," has advanced 156 billion lire between 1952 and the end of 1957 for 3 per cent loans to purchase farm machinery, for irrigation, and to build rural homes.

What conclusions can be drawn from all of this vast activity in industry and agriculture? The greatest economic progress continues to be made in the North. The gap between per capita income in the South and the rest of Italy actually widened between 1951 and 1959. The gap between 11 per cent of the Italians in easy circumstances and over 23 per cent who are poor has not been closed. The ten-year Vanoni plan to create four million new jobs has been off schedule. Investments have not proceeded according to plan and the whole scheme is being re-examined. Much of the new industry uses labor saving machinery. Italian figures do not agree on the number of unemployed. It has been reported that 413,000 more workers were employed in 1959 and there have been indications of increased employment in 1960 and even a shortage of skilled labor in the North. The unemployed probably number considerably more than a million.

Signs of depressed conditions in the center of Italy have been reported.<sup>10</sup> A marked result of increased economic activity has been to arouse new expectations, especially in the

<sup>7</sup> Good summaries of these developments are to be found in *Documenti di Vita Italiana*, Nos. 98-103 and Banco di Roma, *Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy*, XIV (July, 1960), 366-386.

<sup>8</sup> Enrico Mattei, "Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi," *Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy*, XIV (May, 1960), 243-261.

<sup>9</sup> *Economist*, CXCIV (May 21, 1960), 760-762.

<sup>10</sup> Ninetta Jucker, "The Italian State and the South," *Political Quarterly*, XXXI (April-June, 1960), 163-173; *Economist*, CXCII (September 12, 1959), 841, 842; CXCIII (October 31, 1959), 429, 430; CXCIV, 640, 641, 760-762; Banco di Roma, *Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy*, XIV (July, 1960), 367-386.

South. Italians will not continue passively to tolerate a situation where there is almost no social mobility and where almost a fourth of the population lives in varying degrees of poverty. Social and political tensions are likely to mount as patience wears thin with the progress which is being made toward higher living standards. There is also in progress a movement of the population from the country to the city, from the South to the North, from the mountain to the plain. This movement creates vast problems. Even modest rises in the cost of living create serious tensions unless wages continue to rise.

Italy has great expectations that membership in the European Common Market will aid in the solution of many economic problems and seems ready to face the competition and specialization in production which are involved. While only two 10 per cent tariff reductions have been made at the time this is written and while quotas will not be completely abolished until the end of 1961, Italian reaction appears to be on the whole favorable. There are high hopes of attracting capital from other members, of finding European cooperation in relieving Italy's depressed zones, of finding new jobs for Italy's unemployed, and of making up for Italy's restricted internal market in the larger free trade area. Italy's exports to the Common Market increased by 27 per cent in 1959.

Italy works to bring the seven state European Free Trade Association into closer cooperation with the six states of the Common Market. The expansion of the Italian steel industry while Italy is a member of the European Coal and Steel Community, including a 30 per cent rise in production in the first seven months of 1960, encourages Italians to face with confidence the many unresolved problems which the Common Market will bring. For some time liberal economists have argued that membership in a larger market would be an effective means of curbing Italy's monopolies.<sup>11</sup>

### A Coherent Foreign Policy

Out of the ashes of defeat and the humiliation of a relatively harsh peace treaty Italy has forged a foreign policy which is in the best tradition of her diplomacy. The most

conspicuous features of this policy are close friendship and collaboration with the United States, intense work for political and economic integration of Europe, and a new spirit of partnership with the countries of Africa and the Middle East. With the independence of Somaliland on July 1, 1960, the last thread of empire was broken. There has been a realistic acceptance of the loss of an empire which was not profitable.

Italy has become a loyal and important member of Nato and has an outstanding record for meeting Nato obligations. The Italians have found not only defense in Nato but also support for treaty revision and a return into the diplomatic circle of the great powers. Figures recently published indicate Italy's military strength at 350,000. The Italian army consists of five infantry divisions, two armored divisions, five brigades of Alpini, five brigades of infantry, plus a certain number of supporting troops.

The Commander of Allied Forces South Europe is located at Naples. Under this command an Italian Commander of Allied Land Forces South Europe (General Aurelio Guy) has his headquarters at Verona. The Fifth Allied Air Force was established in 1956 with headquarters at Vicenza. A South European Task Force of some 10,000 American troops is also stationed in Italy. The United States and Italy signed an agreement in the spring of 1959 for the establishment of missile bases in Italy. Such words as "Nike" and "Honest John" have now become a part of the Italian vocabulary.

Italy has refused to be intimidated by Russian threats concerning missile bases. G-91 fighters, manufactured by Fiat, have won praise and are being purchased by Nato, especially by West Germany. All indications are that the Italian army is adequately trained, alert and well-armed. Italy's defense expenditures have averaged less than a fourth of the state budget and Italy has received extensive military aid from the United States.

How firm is the United States alliance with Italy? What do the Italians think of

<sup>11</sup> Important recent studies are Karel Holbik, *Italy in International Cooperation* (Padua, 1959); Louis Lister, *Europe's Coal and Steel Community* (New York, 1960); L. Piccardi and others, *La lotta contro i monopoli* (Bari, 1955); Wm. Diebold, Jr., *The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1950-1959* (N.Y., 1959). Italy expects to have steel production at 8.5 million tons within a year. *La Stampa*, October 4, 1960.



the United States? Italians like Americans and vice-versa. The American impact on Italy has been greater than Italians like to admit. But it is the writer's conviction, based upon some 34 months of residence in Italy in recent years, that there has been some lessening of confidence in our political wisdom and our ability to pursue a consistent policy over a long period. Italians sometimes wonder if we practice all we preach. The Italians are a proud people who have been keenly conscious of their weak and dependent position since World War II. They resent any attempt at American dictation or interference in their internal affairs. They seek a position of dignity and partnership. They wish to be consulted and to have a part in decisions which concern Italy's future. They resent any claim by France, England and the United States to assume an exclusive role as the "Big Three." Premier Fanfani has made his position quite clear on this point.

Above all, Italy seeks peace and needs peace. Internal problems, such as the standard of living, have been of greater concern than foreign problems. Italians are as much concerned with economic and cultural collaboration as with military collaboration. One of our most competent experts has recently called Italy the "Constant Ally," but his 1956 study indicated that there has not been majority sentiment for siding with the West and that neutralist sentiment has at times been greater, ranging from one third to almost half the people.<sup>12</sup> All evidence points to a demand for greater consideration; for a true partnership in which Italy's voice is heard and respected.

Italy's national and international posture

at the end of a century of unity warrants neither extreme optimism nor the dire pessimism of so many Italian and foreign observers. Italy is at last in motion. There is a youthfulness and vitality which impresses all who know Italy well. Perhaps no country in Europe is experiencing a greater intellectual ferment. The economic resurgence is now spectacular. Italy at the end of 1960 is a far cry from the prostrate Italy of 1945.<sup>13</sup>

But the problems, while different, are perhaps as great: how to satisfy great expectations of people who will no longer passively accept poverty and social immobility; how to bring the long-stagnant South up to a position of equality with the rest of the nation; how to develop a more effective government which will enlist the confidence and loyal support of the Italians; how to prepare Italians for more active participation in a democracy; how to use Italy's position and diplomatic skill to push aside threats to peace and to create an effective European order. Rising production figures are not enough if the gap between rich and poor fails to close or even widens. But the economic revival furnishes the base on which many things become possible. Never have Italy's opportunities for solid progress been greater. Never have Italy's problems been more complex.

<sup>12</sup> Lloyd A. Free, *Six Allies and a Neutral* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 113-130; Lloyd A. Free and Renzo Sereno, *Italy: Dependent Ally or Independent Partner?* (Princeton, 1956), p. 87. Sentiment for siding with the West had averaged about 40 per cent. Lloyd A. Free, "Italian Political Behaviour: A Psychological Diagnosis," Part I, is an equally valuable study made in 1955 in "working draft" stage.

<sup>13</sup> Excellent for the early years of the Italian Republic are H. Stuart Hughes, *The United States and Italy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), and Muriel Grindrod, *The Rebuilding of Italy* (London, 1955). Valuable for background are Norman Kogan, *Italy and the Allies* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) and Denis Mack Smith, *Italy* (Ann Arbor, 1959).

(Continued from p. 33)

tives to the success of Spain's stabilization program: it may fail, or a harried government may abandon it midway and run for the illusory cover of another round of inflation. The latter course might well stave off domestic, economic and political crises for a time; but it would certainly sacrifice all that Spain gained towards European rehabilitation by adopting stabilization in the first

place. And if the program is adhered to but fails, the power groups that have hitherto been the main props of Franco's regime may be expected to turn the 68-year-old dictator out to pasture. In that event civil war would be improbable and a Communist take-over virtually impossible. The most likely outcome would be a politically conservative regime oriented towards a more responsive Western Europe.

*Discussing British relations with the emerging West European community, this specialist states that differences between Britain and the European Economic Community have led to renewed attempts "to link Europe's two trade blocs," "uniting the E.F.T.A. and the E.E.C., or Britain with the E.E.C." Should Britain "seek admission to Europe's supra-national communities and . . . then try to arrange some form of association for the Commonwealth countries"?*

# Britain and West European Integration

BY SYDNEY H. ZEBEL

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A PERCEPTIVE student of modern European diplomatic history is likely to be struck by the frequent recurrence of significant patterns of behavior on the part of the major powers. One such pattern may be found in Anglo-European relations. The British, living on the periphery of the Continent, adopted Janus-like policies towards their neighbors across the Channel: endeavoring to ignore Europe's affairs and problems, yet usually finding it either impossible or unfeasible to avoid involvement. "A ship moored in European waters, but always ready to sail away," so André Siegfried once characterized the insular nation. For their part, the continental countries harbored deep-rooted suspicion of the British and frequently voiced their distrust with the old cry, "Perfidious Albion." This was a natural enough reaction since Britain's balance-of-power policy, the main reason for her intervention in Europe, required astute diplomatic maneuvers and sudden reversals of

alliances—and too often resulted in sanguinary conflicts.

Even a cursory survey of contemporary diplomacy reveals the existence of this same behavior pattern in the mid-twentieth century. True enough, the growth of Soviet Russia's power after World War II and, in particular, the Communist expansion into Central Europe completely outmoded the old balance-of-power diplomacy. To check Russia's advance, Britain felt compelled to depart from her cherished isolationism and to make unprecedented military commitments to her neighbors. But the old British ambivalence still persisted. The British signed the Brussels Pact and became part of the Western European Union, but refused to join either the European Defense Community or the European Coal and Steel Community. They were initiators of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union but rejected membership in the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The British, it is apparent, were not averse to joining in Free Europe's intergovernmental agencies but were adamantly opposed to participating in any of the new supra-national institutions. As in earlier history, Britain's policies gave rise to outbursts of suspicion and ill-feeling on the part of the other European nations.

The general nature of present day British-European relationships is seen most clearly,

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though in microcosm, in the protracted controversy which has developed over the recently formed European Economic Community. The genesis of that organization—also known as the European Common Market—may be traced back to an American suggestion made in 1947, when the O.E.E.C. was first being discussed, that Britain should join with the free nations of the Continent to form a customs union.<sup>1</sup> At the time, the Attlee government hardly took the suggestion seriously, expressing doubts whether Britain's relations with the Commonwealth would permit any such arrangement. However, the American policy-makers persisted in their advocacy of a closer link among the Western European countries—and their arguments eventually met with positive results.

Late in 1949, the O.E.E.C. inaugurated programs for the gradual elimination of intra-European import restrictions and the restoration of multilateral payments among its members. Even so, to "Europeans"<sup>2</sup> like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, such intergovernmental economic cooperation through a purely consultative body appeared totally inadequate. In 1951, largely through their efforts, the "Schuman Plan" was adopted. Six continental countries—Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany—took the initial step towards Western European integration by creating the European Coal and Steel Community. To this new supra-national authority was assigned the task of coordinating and regulating the production and marketing of coal and steel in the member countries. Success in sectoral integration shortly led the members of "Little Europe" to consider even more ambitious projects.

In May–June, 1955, the foreign ministers of the Coal and Steel Community countries met at Messina, Sicily. Here, on the initiative of the Benelux nations, they adopted an epoch-making resolution calling on the member states "to pursue the establishment of a United Europe by developing common institutions, by the progressive fusion of national economies, by creating a common market, and by the progressive harmonization of social policies."<sup>3</sup> The foreign ministers sought to implement this resolution by appointing a study committee of governmental delegates,

headed by the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, who was known to be an enthusiastic champion of European federation.

#### The E.E.C.

On April 21, 1956, the Spaak Committee submitted a favorable report and with it plans for creating a European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and a European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Spaak Report was approved as a basis for the negotiation of definitive agreements by the foreign ministers at the Venice Conference a month later. However, it took almost a year of hard bargaining to remove various objectionable features and to add certain safeguards required by the participating states, particularly by traditionally protectionist France. On March 25, 1957, the "Six" signed the Treaty of Rome creating these two new European agencies. Following ratification by the various national parliaments, the treaty finally became operative on January 1, 1958.

The E.E.C. treaty, the subject of our concern here, is a lengthy and complex document, designed to revolutionize relations among the six countries and their 165 million inhabitants. In substance, the members agreed to join together in a customs union with progressive abolition during a 12–15 year transitional period of all restrictions on internal trade. Provision was made for the early adoption of a common external tariff and the removal of restrictions on the movement of capital and labor, the eventual establishment of a common agricultural policy, and the progressive harmonization of social benefits. The agreement also called for joint participation in financing the economic development of the members' overseas territories, notably those then belonging to the French in Africa. To insure proper direction and coordination of policy, four major

<sup>1</sup> Miriam Camps, "Britain, the Six and American Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX (October, 1960), 112. For a different version, which credits Germany with the real initiative, see E. Strauss, *Common Sense about the Common Market* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 20–21.

<sup>2</sup> The term "Europeans," as used here in quotation marks, refers to those persons who favor the political and economic federation of Europe along supra-national lines. Their ultimate goal is a "United States of Europe."

<sup>3</sup> Serge Hurtig, "The European Common Market," *International Conciliation*, No. 517 (March, 1958), pp. 326–327. The text of the entire resolution may be found in *Parliamentary Papers*, Cmnd. 9525 (London: H.M.S.O., 1955).

organs were created: a Council of Ministers, a European Commission, a Parliamentary Assembly, and a Court of Justice.<sup>4</sup>

From the outset, the Eden government in London had closely watched the progress of the E.E.C. negotiations. After the Venice Conference (May, 1956), it became evident that the Six were moving ahead with their plans despite Britain's non-cooperation. The British then sought to find some means of preventing Common Market discrimination against their exports and of slowing down the pace of European integration. At the June meeting of the O.E.E.C. Council, they secured adoption of their motion for the appointment of a committee to study possible ways of associating the other countries of Free Europe with the proposed new trade community. This committee reported back in January, 1957, that such association was "technically possible" through a European free trade area,<sup>5</sup> which would include the Common Market countries as a unit and the various other European countries which belonged to the O.E.E.C. However, the committee also noted the existence of numerous serious practical problems, including the difficulty of preventing trade deflection by member countries having lower tariff duties than the rest.

### British Proposals

A few weeks later, the O.E.E.C. ministers formally considered this report and decided to proceed with negotiations for the creation of "a European Free Trade Area, which would, on a multilateral basis, associate the European Common Market with other Member countries of the Organization. . . ."<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, it was already evident that the British had made up their minds on the form the free trade area should take. The new Macmillan cabinet, which had assumed office in January after the Suez fiasco, insisted on the exclusion of agriculture (primarily to allow the retention of the preferential duties on Commonwealth produce) and thereby alienated the Netherlands and the other food-exporting countries of the Continent. It rejected the idea, regarded as vital by France, for the harmonization of taxation and social legislation. It opposed any supranational institutional framework, thus arous-

ing the opposition of the "Europeans." On a number of essential features, therefore, the British proposals were at direct variance with those of the Common Market countries.

The negotiations for the proposed European free trade area dragged on throughout the spring and summer of 1957. The British refused to budge at all from the positions they had taken initially. Undoubtedly they were counting on the possibility that the Common Market treaty, like the 1954 E.D.C. pact, might not be ratified by France. However, following the National Assembly's approval of the treaty in August, the London government was jolted into an awareness of reality. Prime Minister Macmillan now authorized Reginald Maudling, the British Paymaster General, to coordinate policy within the cabinet and to open really serious negotiations with the E.E.C. countries. This time it was the latter who showed an unwillingness to make concessions.

During the long-drawn out discussions which followed over the next year and a quarter, it was clear that the Treaty of Rome countries regarded the British-sponsored free trade area as advantageous only to Britain and as a threat to their own desire for closer economic and political unity. The Maudling negotiations finally ground to a complete halt in November, 1958. The fundamental conflict of views had been revealed some months earlier in a statement by Professor Walter Hallstein, the newly-elected president of the European Commission: ". . . The elimination of tariffs [as proposed by the British] cannot lead to economically reasonable results or be maintained in the long run unless it is supplemented by a series of economic-political measures."<sup>7</sup> The main oppo-

<sup>4</sup> A detailed analysis of the Common Market treaty may be found in Hurtig, *op. cit.*, Chapters II-IV, and in Miriam Camps' very valuable little studies, *The European Common Market and American Policy* (1956) and *The European Common Market and Free Trade Area* (1957). These are Memoranda No. 11 and No. 15 of the Center of International Studies and were published by Princeton University.

<sup>5</sup> There is a fundamental difference between a customs union and a free trade area. Both provide for internal free trade, but the customs union would eventually require the member-nations to have a common external tariff while the free trade area would allow its members to keep their own tariff structures.

<sup>6</sup> OEEC Press Release A (57), February 13, 1957, quoted in Camps, *The European Common Market and Free Trade Area*, p. 18 fn.

<sup>7</sup> Statement of Professor Hallstein to the European Parliamentary Assembly, March 20, 1958, quoted in another of Miss Camps' studies, *The Free Trade Area Negotiations* (Center of International Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 18. Princeton University, 1959), p. 12.



sition to the free trade area, it should be noted, came from the French and the "Europeans." Apart from its economic objections to the British proposal, the new de Gaulle government saw in a restricted Common Market an opportunity to create a Franco-German entente which would dominate Western Europe and assure France a greater voice in Nato decisions. Professor Hallstein and the other "Europeans" viewed the E.E.C. as a long step forward towards the creation of a "United States of Europe" and feared that European unity would be postponed indefinitely by the looser free trade area project.

Following the breakdown of the free trade area negotiations, Britain and other European countries began to consider the retaliatory measures they might adopt to protect their trade—this despite an offer by the Six to extend most of the Common Market tariff reductions scheduled for January 1, 1959, to the other O.E.E.C. members on a most-favored-nation basis. It was the Swedish and Swiss governments which came up with the idea of forming a rival trading group. The British hesitated briefly, then decided to proceed with this scheme. On July 21, 1959, ministers from seven countries—Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland—approved a draft plan for "a little free trade area"; and, on November 20, the treaty establishing the European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.) was signed at Stockholm.<sup>8</sup>

The signatory nations—the "Outer Seven" or "Seven" as they become known—undertook to abolish gradually the tariffs among themselves on industrial goods. The tariffs were to be cut by 20 per cent on July 1, 1960, and by 10 per cent each year thereafter until 1970. This was virtually the same timetable as that projected by the Treaty of Rome countries. However, unlike the E.E.C., the E.F.T.A. decided not to create a common external tariff or any supra-national institutions. A Council of Ministers would have general supervision of the association and would consider what further action was necessary to promote its objectives. Though arguing the intrinsic merits of the E.F.T.A., the signatories' prime reason for creating the new organization was unmistakably their

calculation that thereby their chances for an accommodation with the E.E.C. would be improved.

Contrary to the E.F.T.A.'s hopes, the E.E.C. was quite unwilling to resume the talks suspended in November, 1958. The European Commission was anxious to consolidate the Common Market while business conditions in Europe remained highly favorable and while Konrad Adenauer, an enthusiastic "European," still remained German chancellor. The Commission was strongly backed in its views by the American State Department, which felt that closer cooperation among France, Germany, and the other countries of "Little Europe" would greatly strengthen the free world in the cold war. Thus relations between the Six and the Seven deteriorated greatly during the autumn of 1959. The British cautioned that a trade war and political rift loomed on the horizon. The Council of Ministers of the Six discounted the warnings and refused even to answer an E.F.T.A. note suggesting the reopening of negotiations.

At this juncture, the United States sought to ease the growing tension between the two European blocs. During the Western Summit meeting of December, 1959, it recommended the convening of a Special Economic Conference with representatives from the Six, the Seven, the various other O.E.E.C. countries,<sup>9</sup> and the United States and Canada as participants. This conference met in January, 1960, but it was again soon evident that there was little harmony among the powers. The British were still intent on forming a Europe-wide trading arrangement. France and Germany opposed the British plan on the ground that it would destroy the Common Market. The United States, though still backing the E.E.C., now favored the reduction of trading barriers globally, rather than on a regional basis.<sup>10</sup> This new attitude was dictated largely by

<sup>8</sup> A useful brief summary of the E.F.T.A. Convention, together with an account of its background and future prospects, was published by the British Information Services in a special issue of the *British Record*, December, 1959. The full text is available as a White Paper, Cmd. 906 (London: H.M.S.O., 1959).

<sup>9</sup> These were Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and Turkey. Spain had become a full member of O.E.E.C. in July, 1959.

<sup>10</sup> This did not actually represent a contradiction since the United States regarded the E.E.C. as an embryonic new state, rather than as a regional trading arrangement.

America's concern over its loss of foreign markets, its unfavorable balance of payments and the consequent transfer of sizable gold deposits from America to Europe, and the growing complaints of the underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia against European trade discrimination.

Despite the wide divergence in the positions of the powers, the meetings did result in several agreements. The participants promised to share with the United States the burden of aiding the underdeveloped countries. A group of experts—the four “Wise Men”—was appointed to study the advisability of creating a successor organization to the O.E.E.C., which would admit the United States and Canada as full members. Finally, the conference agreed to a vague resolution recommending to the 20 governments that they constitute themselves into a new committee for the consideration of existing trade problems. Though the British would have preferred direct negotiations with the E.E.C. countries, the resumption of any discussions at all was a source of considerable satisfaction.

The Committee of Twenty met in Paris at the end of March, 1960. There was general recognition that an accord was urgent before the scheduled tariff reductions were made, on July 1, by both the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A. It was also agreed that the secretariat should prepare, prior to the next meeting of the committee in May, a factual study of the effects of various possible arrangements. However, just as this first session of the Committee of Twenty was nearing its close, unofficial reports were received of Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Washington and of the ominous warnings he had addressed to American officials about the consequences of Europe's split into rival trade blocs. The British, he had declared bluntly, might have to reimpose restrictions on dollar imports and even make reductions in the number of their soldiers stationed in Germany.

#### **E.E.C.—E.F.T.A. Rift**

The contents, as well as the timing, of these talks were most unfortunate. They seemed overt threats to the nations of “Little Europe” and gave rise to great excitement and indignation. They strengthened support

on the Continent, and in Washington as well, for a proposal, made public a few weeks earlier by Professor Hallstein, that the E.E.C. tariff reduction schedule be accelerated and that the common external tariff be introduced a year and a half in advance of the original plan. These actions would inevitably result in considerable discrimination against the exports of the E.F.T.A. countries and in reprisals against the exports of the Six. The Parliamentary Assembly, which earlier had been divided over the acceleration proposal, now endorsed it almost unanimously.

Surprisingly enough, the crisis which followed the Macmillan visit to Washington helped clear the air considerably. The British prime minister tried to explain away his remarks and displayed a much more conciliatory attitude towards the Common Market countries. The latter, it soon became apparent, were also fearful of a full-fledged trade war and were anxious to avoid the dangerous political consequences. At a meeting in Luxembourg in mid-May, the E.E.C. foreign ministers adopted a German proposal that new discussions be initiated with the British on ways of improving relations between the Six and the Seven and that these discussions be conducted by the foreign ministers, rather than by the European Commission. As an additional conciliatory gesture, it was decided to postpone the tariff acceleration, scheduled for July 1, 1960, until the end of the year. The decision to delay acceleration was warmly received by the Seven since it allowed a breathing-space during which new attempts might be made to work out a long-term settlement.

As evidence of the improved atmosphere, numerous rumors now began to circulate that the British might reconsider their position and might seek admission to the E.E.C. If Britain joined, it appeared only a matter of time before the other E.F.T.A. nations would follow suit. These rumors were greatly strengthened when John Profumo, the British minister of state, informed the Western European Union Assembly early in June that Her Majesty's Government was ready to consider anew the possibility of membership in both the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom. The Profumo offer, obviously a “trial balloon,” was rebuffed by

the de Gaulle government, which feared that a détente with Britain would end French aspirations for hegemony in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the Six did announce that they were ready to lessen their discrimination on products that were important to intra-European trade.

During the summer and early autumn of 1960, evidence accumulated that the British government was still intent on ending the impasse with the E.E.C. countries. The Bonn government, it was apparent, was also prepared to make concessions. Adenauer believed that the restoration of Western European unity was essential in view of the collapse of the May East-West Summit meeting, the growing East German threat to Berlin, the deteriorating international situation in the Congo and Cuba, and America's absorption in its forthcoming presidential election. At a meeting in Bonn in August, the German Chancellor informed Macmillan that Germany now favored a "government-to-government" solution of the problems of the Six and the Seven; that he was ready to slow down, if not abandon, the trend towards political supra-nationalism in Europe; and, finally, that if the British would join the E.E.C. he was prepared to allow the free entry of Commonwealth produce into the Common Market. Adenauer's conciliatory statements were endorsed by Italy and the Benelux countries. Even in France, there appeared signs of a desire for an agreement: editorials in Paris newspapers criticized sharply the de Gaulle government's policy of deliberately excluding Britain from the European communities.

At the end of August, London journalists reported that Macmillan had formulated a new plan—the details of which were not revealed—to link Europe's two trade blocs, that Adenauer and Premier Amintore Fanfani of Italy had approved it, and that only the French president's support was still needed. It was clear that the diplomats were engaged in confidential negotiations to effect a settlement.<sup>11</sup> The basic question was whether the Macmillan plan could be reconciled with General de Gaulle's public proposals for a new loose European confederation which would cooperate in political, military, economic, and cultural matters.

At the time this article went to press, no answer had been found to this extremely difficult question. No final settlement had yet been announced for uniting the E.F.T.A. and the E.E.C., or Britain with the E.E.C. Even so, the critical tension which had existed as late as the spring of 1960 had been much reduced and there seemed sound reasons to justify a somewhat optimistic outlook. For this improvement, West German policies and the dangerous international situation were partly responsible. Quite as important, in all probability, was the change in Britain's own attitude toward the Continent. Opinion in that country, both official and non-official, had shifted considerably during the years 1955–1960; and there were unmistakable signs that the old ambivalence was waning. At the time of the Messina Conference, the London government had expressed its unalterable opposition to membership in a more closely integrated Europe. Like the noted French scholar-journalist Raymond Aron, it believed that "The name Europe distinguishes a continent or a civilization, not an economic or political unit."<sup>12</sup> Yet, by the summer of 1960, the Macmillan cabinet was seriously discussing the possibility of membership in the European Coal and Steel Community, in Euratom, and even in the Common Market.

A few cynical observers, noting the recent statements by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer opposing closer European integration, have remarked that the British government is ready to join the Common Market now that it can do so "without commitment to ambitious future political aims which the existing members themselves have not accepted."<sup>13</sup> This charge is not completely without foundation. But it should be noted that many of Her Majesty's subjects, including numerous prominent members of the business community, have been much impressed by the spectacular economic

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd's remarks during the House of Commons debate, July 25, 1960: "I myself have been in almost continuous contact either directly or through diplomatic channels with my colleagues the Foreign Ministers of the Six about these matters [the trade negotiations]. We have had repeated discussions on these matters and the very fact that they took place through diplomatic channels does not mean that the whole world knows about them [author's italics]."

<sup>12</sup> Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War* (Beacon Press edition, Boston, 1955), p. 313.

<sup>13</sup> *The Economist*, July 23, 1960.

prosperity of the E.E.C. countries. In their opinion, self-interest, as well as other considerations, dictates that Britain should seek admission to Europe's supra-national communities and should then try to arrange some form of association for the Commonwealth countries. The views of this group have obviously influenced cabinet policy. On July 25, 1960, speaking then in his role as Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd described Britain's changed attitude toward Europe to an attentive House of Commons:

We in Britain regard ourselves as part of

(Continued from p. 28)

with really crucial problems, the Executive proved unable either to reach unequivocal decisions or to enforce them. The Fifth hoped to avoid this vice by eliminating Parliament; but it forgot the Army by whose grace it had come to be. Today, as the coherence of the Executive declines, as orders

Europe. By history, by tradition, by civilization, by sentiment, by geography, we are part of Europe. . . . If Britain were to be regarded as outside Europe, we could not fulfill our complete role in the world. Nor do I believe that Europe would be complete without us.

. . . I state categorically our wish for a united Europe, politically, economically and commercially. . . . Some people talk of integration, others of federation, others of confederation, others again of association. One is not any the less a good European because one prefers one method rather than another. Our purpose is a united Europe and we accept the need for some political organization as an element in this unity.

and counter-orders fly through the channels of command, Right and Left take up once more the struggle for succession. The issue is fundamental. The struggle might be bloody. But the decision rests, as open power may before too long, with the soldiers and with their guns.

"The United Nations has become progressively more representative. But we must remember that, even now, it is not fully so. Colonialism still has its strong footholds in some parts, and racialism and racial domination are still prevalent, more especially in Africa.

"During these past fifteen years, the United Nations has been often criticized for its structure and for some of its activities. These criticisms have often had some justification behind them. But, looking at this broad picture, I think we can definitely say that the United Nations has amply justified its existence and repeatedly prevented our recurrent crises from developing into war. It has played a great role and it is a little difficult now to think of this troubled world without the United Nations. If it has defects, those defects lie in the world situation itself which inevitably it mirrors. If there had been no United Nations today, our first task would be to create something of that kind. I should like, therefore, to pay my tribute to the work of the United Nations as a whole, even though I might criticize some aspect of it from time to time.

"The structure of the United Nations when it started was weighted in favor of Europe and the Americas. It did not seem to us to be fair to the countries of Asia and Africa. But we appreciated the difficulties of the situation and did not press for any changes. With the growth of the United Nations and more countries coming in, that structure today is still unbalanced. Even so, we wish to proceed slowly and with agreement and not to press for any change which would involve an immediate amendment of the Charter and the raising of heated controversies. Unfortunately we live in a split world which is constantly coming up against the basic assumptions of the United Nations. We have to bear with this and try to move ever more forward to that conception of full cooperation between nations.

"That cooperation does not and must not mean any domination of one country by another, any coercion or compulsion forcing any country to line up with another country. Each country has something to give and something to take from others. . . . —*Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, in a speech delivered to the U.N. General Assembly on October 3, 1960.*



## Received At Our Desk

**EUROPE WILL NOT WAIT.** By ANTHONY NUTTING. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 122 pages, \$3.50.)

The most important problem facing the West today is not the threat of Soviet power, but the future of Western unity. In our preoccupation with the day-to-day crises of the cold war we tend to neglect the smoldering crises of the West. Anthony Nutting, former member of Parliament and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (from 1954 to 1956), has written an incisive, important criticism of Britain's persistent refusal to face up to the realities of contemporary Europe. Specifically, he criticizes Britain's rejection of the three major steps made toward European unity: the European Coal and Steel Community; the European Defense Community; and the Common Market. Western Europe has moved ahead under the leadership of France and West Germany.

Nutting shows clearly and cogently the weaknesses of "Great Britain's European policy—or lack of it—in the fifteen years since Yalta—a story of too little and too late, of miscalculations and missed opportunities." He notes that "when we could have led the European community we were content to observe, misguidedly believing that it would never work. Now that we want to get with it, we are told to stay outside." What can be done now? ". . . If the West, let alone Great Britain, is to withstand the competitive power of the Communist world, it must galvanize and mobilize all its productive capacities—industrial and scientific—in a manner without any precedent in history. An economic Nato, patterned on the principles of the European Common Market, must be applied to the whole Atlantic Community, including the Americas."

Other men have sounded a similar clarion call. One can go beyond Nutting,

to the vision of an Atlantic Community—a common citizenship for the peoples of Western Europe, the Americas, and the Commonwealth. What is certain is that the West must move to promote its political and economic, not merely military, strength and unity. There is no other way to combat the mortal challenge of communism. A.Z.R.

**BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE.** By HERBERT FEIS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. 367 pages, supplementary notes, bibliography, and index, \$6.50.)

Herbert Feis is one of our most distinguished historians. His previous works have been noted for their erudition, lucidity, sophisticated analysis, and excellent organization. In this narrative of the period between the defeat of Germany in May, 1945, and the Potsdam Conference of July, 1945, he has again written first-rate history. "The first section tells how the surrender of Germany was effected, when the last attempt to divide her enemies failed. The next sections trace the flow of dissension within the coalition, the inner fractures that led to separation. The final section tells of the conference of the three Heads of Government at Potsdam—named Terminal. For it was conceived that at this meeting the situations left by the war would be resolved, and the nations would find, at the end of their sad journey, peace." But with frustration and incompatible concepts of national security came disillusionment, alienation, and the cold war.

The full story of these dramatic months is here. Three problems dominated the scene: the problem of what to do with Germany; the growing evidences of So-

viet imperialist intentions in Eastern Europe; and the war in the Far East. Of the three Heads of Government present at Potsdam, "Stalin was most nearly content at what had been done at Potsdam, for the Soviet position in regard to those European matters of most direct interest had come through unscathed"; "Churchill was depressed at the pull of the Soviet Union on Europe, and at the refusal of the American government to adopt his ideas of political and military strategy." And he was anxious over the elections taking place at home. Truman presented "the image of a man of brisk decision, a person who, having once heard the pertinent facts, made up his mind swiftly and firmly—some observers thought impetuously."

Interested readers may delve at leisure into this scholarly gem. But the concluding thoughts of Mr. Feis, who rarely indulges in editorial rumination, will perhaps be of more immediate interest to present readers.

Maybe, despite the dreary repetitive battle of yeas and nays that is going on as I write these closing pages, after much wearing turmoil the West and the Communist realm will reach a mutually tolerable adjustment of their quarrels. Ironically enough, the chance that they will do so derives mainly from the "mutuality of terror"—from their power to destroy each other.

But how long will it be effective against the push of national rivalries and resentments if these are not subdued? Not forever, certainly. Long enough, it must be hoped, for all to learn to improve their ways and for time to bring about peaceful change. Truly in these years men and women are hearing the summons: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life that both thee and thy seed may live."

To choose life, the great nations must one and all live and act more maturely and more trustfully than they did during the months that followed the end of the war against Germany. They must invalidate the historic lessons about national behavior that were illustrated during this period. The capability of men to respond to reason—and to master their passionate purposes and fancies—is undergoing its ultimate test.

A.Z.R.

**THE TWILIGHT OF EUROPEAN COLONIALISM: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS.** BY STEWART C. EASTON. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1960. 542 pages, bibliographies and index, \$7.50.)

Dealing primarily with Africa, this volume is a welcome and necessary addition to the literature on that area. The book includes the first extensive treatment in English of recent developments in what was French Equatorial and West Africa. Of the 18 chapters, 9 are concerned with British, 5 with French, 1 with Portuguese, and 1 with Belgian (including the Congo) territories. While the accent is on politics, relevant economic factors have been included. Dr. Easton traces the ways in which the major colonial powers are adjusting to the change from domination to cooperation, and the manner in which "the various colonial systems of government have been evolving." The emphasis is on post-war developments.

The colorful story is told against the background of a nationalism which is versatile and can be (and is) exploited for diverse reasons. Nationalism develops and is fostered as a means of opposing colonial powers, of advancing the timetable of devolution of responsibility, or of transcending territorial boundaries as in the case of the French Community. Internally, nationalism may serve to create the cohesion necessary for self-government, to rally unsuspected support for African leaders, but also to intensify traditional rivalries. Nationalism is thus broadened to accommodate new facets.

African political reactions are analyzed in terms of the various structures used by the new countries. The author distinguishes basically federal and unitary institutions, and discusses trends between these two poles as methods to solve the new problem of catering to politically conscious masses and of balancing interests. The author's historical perspective provides a welcome change from excessive emphasis on present turbulent political events, thus forcefully demonstrating that perspective is essential for thorough understanding. Dr. Easton states basic issues with clarity,

identifies colonial theories and policies as reflections of the mother countries' own institutions and values, and relates the differing African solutions to the dynamics of their internal conditions.

WALTER SKURNIK  
University of Pennsylvania

**IMPERIALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM.** BY BERNARD SEMMEL. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. 283 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$4.50.)

This study discusses "social-imperialism" in Great Britain in the two decades prior to the outbreak of the first world war. The term "social-imperialism" is used to describe the efforts of the ruling classes (the wealthy, the nobility, the advocates of empire) to win the support of the working classes for a policy of imperialism through the introduction of social welfare measures.

The author analyzes the two rival imperialist programs: "that of Joseph Chamberlain and the adherents of the programme of Tariff Reform and imperialism preference" and that of the Liberal party which advocated a combination of social reform and overseas expansion. In addition to analyzing the essentials of these programs, Dr. Semmel discusses the individual positions of various social-imperialists: Benjamin Kidd and Karl Pearson—social-Darwinists who argued for the enrichment of England at the expense of the colonies; Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb, Fabian Socialists who urged a "lofty and public-spirited Imperialism" which would "rebound to the public interest rather than to private interests." The writings of other noted thinkers are treated: W. J. Ashley, Sir Halford MacKinder, and Viscount Milner. This is a scholarly, sophisticated discussion of ideas and attitudes which were influential, not only prior to 1914, but also since as well.

A.Z.R.

**THE CONSCIENCE OF THE REVOLUTION: COMMUNIST OPPOSITION IN SOVIET RUSSIA.** BY ROBERT

VINCENT DANIELS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. 526 pages, appendices, bibliography, and index, \$10.00.)

For more than a generation before his death in 1953, Stalin was undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union. He molded the key political, social, and economic institutions into an integrated, comprehensive system of totalitarianism. Though the Party lost much of its former vitality and power under Stalin, it was through the Party that Stalin first gained mastery over the country. In the process, the Party was changed. "Until Stalin transmuted it into his own image, the Communist movement was not simple, homogeneous, and monolithic, but complex, dissentious, and changeable." Prior to 1929, there existed several opposition factions within the Communist movement. It is with the history of this Communist opposition, its programs and personalities, that this excellent study is concerned.

The author contends that by 1917 the Communist movement had assumed an essentially dualistic character, i.e., "Leninist" and "Leftist." "In essence, the difference between the two tendencies was that of power and principle—of revolutionary pragmatism and revolutionary idealism. The divergence between the two currents was not always sharp or exclusive, but there was a vital difference of emphasis between those whose eyes were on the ends of the revolution and those whose attention was consumed by the means which its success seemed to require." Tracing the development of the Bolshevik party through the period of "War Communism," the author proceeds to analyze the key Party struggles of the 1920's: the trade union controversy; the dissensions arising out of the N.E.P. program and the Party fights which they engendered; and, above all, the struggle for the succession.

Professor Daniels underscores the reasons for Trotsky's failure (and the failure of the Communist opposition) to succeed Lenin: a) By accepting Lenin's concept of a single ruling party, the Opposition was incapable of creating the only alterna-

tive which might have made a difference, namely, a willingness to form another party; b) The Opposition was disunited and this disunity "made it still easier for the organization men to assert their power"; c) The Opposition lacked any real anti-authoritarian beliefs. When in positions of power, it acted with the same ruthlessness and disregard of dissent as the Stalinists; d) Finally, Trotsky failed to appreciate the importance of organization as a weapon of political power.

Professor Daniels has written an outstanding book. It is superbly documented, lucidly written, and analyzed with sophistication and insight. He has handled complex material with unique skill. A sense of drama, too often absent in scholarly works, is present throughout. This is a first-rate work of scholarship. He is also to be congratulated for including appendices (particularly on the Composition of the Chief Party Organs) which effectively enhance the body of the book. An excellent bibliography and extensive notes are also provided. A.Z.R.

**POLITICS AND TRADE POLICY.** By JOE R. WILKINSON. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. 151 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$3.75.)

Traditionally, the United States has supported the principle of "uninhibited trade between nations." The economic arguments in favor of trade expansion have long had a sympathetic audience. Despite important advances in this direction, "few in Congress have been willing even to attest to the validity of the economic argument, and fewer still in their political role have been anxious to establish tariff-making and trade policy on a firm national foundation to the possible detriment of local constituents." Political practice has contrasted vividly with professions of principle. At present, the net "loss" of dollars and gold has provided new ammunition for those who favor higher tariffs and a more restrictive trade policy.

This sober, solid case study "explores the political process itself as it operated relative to the Reciprocal Trade Agree-

ments Program during the years 1934-1958." The author limits himself "to a study of the respective positions of the political parties in Congress with respect to the original Trade Agreements Act and the changes in their respective positions during the ensuing years relative to the various extensions of the Act." He presents the case for the opposition (the protectionists) fairly and effectively. However, he believes that the national interest of the United States demands a more far-sighted, judicious commitment to promoting trade and lowering tariff barriers. A.Z.R.

**BASIC VALUES OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION.** By SHEPARD B. CLOUGH. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. 132 pages, \$3.00.)

One of the ways in which the West has failed in its response to the Soviet (and Communist) challenge is its failure, thus far, to articulate the fundamentals of the Western way of life. Aside from a "few well-worn clichés, including remarks about life, liberty and equality," we have failed to express the essentials of Western civilization in a manner meaningful to the average man.

Professor Clough believes that the "West's system of basic values rests on a firm conviction that 'the end of man is man,' that we strive to create a 'better life' for the individual on this earth." His concepts of the essentials of our civilization may be summed up as follows. "(1) by the extent to which people extend their control over their physical environment to provide for the material wants of man; (2) by the degree to which men live together in peace and harmony according to the Golden Rule; (3) by the measure to which great aesthetic works are created and enjoyed; and (4) by the creation of conditions which make it possible for individuals to realize their full potential for contributing to civilization."

He is optimistic about the future of Western man and his basic commitment to these fundamentals. However, he is very much aware of the limitations of such an appeal in non-Western areas. A.Z.R.



# Current Documents

## DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION

Speaking before French radio and television audiences on May 31, 1960, following the breakup of the summit talks earlier in the month, French President Charles de Gaulle reasserted his belief in French independence within a wider European alliance. Excerpts of his speech follow:

... Until we achieve an organized peace, if that is at all possible, France intends, as far as she is concerned, to be ready to defend herself. This means, first of all, that she shall remain an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, the recent trial has shown the deep-seated solidarity which exists among the Western powers. Of course, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan and I each have our own problems and our own temperament[s]. But, when faced with recent events, we three, in view of the friendship which unites us, did not have much trouble in reaching agreement, in wisdom and in firmness. Our alliance appeared a living reality. In order that it become even more so, France must have her own role in it, and her own personality. This implies that she too must acquire a nuclear armament, since others have one, that she must be sole mistress of her resources and her territory, in short, that her destiny, although associated with that of her allies, must remain in her own hands. It goes without saying that such an autonomy must be coupled with an ever closer coordination among the Western world powers, regarding their policy and their strategy.

But if the Atlantic Alliance is necessary at present for the security of France and of the other free peoples of our old continent, they must, behind this shield, organize to achieve their joint power and development. The trials they have gone through showed them how much their divisions and conflicts had cost them. Neither the Rhine, nor the Low Countries, nor the Alps nor the Pyrenees, nor the English Channel nor the Mediterranean, for which they fought so long and so bitterly, any longer set them one against the other. No feeling of hatred remains between them. On the contrary, the nostalgia inspired in each of these lands by its relative downfall

in relation to the great new empires has drawn them closer in the feeling that together they would regain this grandeur for which past centuries had given them the talent and the habit. To this must be added the fact that they constitute an incomparable whole, precisely when our time, which abolishes distances and obstacles, demands large ensembles.

To contribute to build Western Europe into a political, economic, cultural and human group, organized for action, progress and defense—that is what France wants to work toward. Already West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are cooperating directly with her in several fields. In particular, the Common Market of the Six will, on December 31, become a practical reality. Of course, the participants do not want this organization to injure the other countries of Europe, and we must expect a way to be found of accommodating interests. Also of course, the nations which are becoming associated must not cease to be themselves, and the path to be followed must be that of organized cooperation between states, while waiting to achieve perhaps an imposing confederation. . . .

Now, in the last analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium that the world will find peace. On our old continent, the organization of a western group, at the very least equivalent to that which exists in the east, may one day, without risk to the independence and freedom of each nation and taking into account the probable evolution of political regimes, establish a European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies become out-of-date, would again be the heart of civilization.

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## U.S. VIEWS ON THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION

On May 17, 1960, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Charles W. Adair, Jr., presented the U.S. view of the E.F.T.A. to the sixteenth meeting of those nations participating in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Geneva, Switzerland. Excerpts from Adair's statement follow:

The present session affords the Contracting Parties their first opportunity to review the Stockholm Convention, one of the more significant postwar developments in international commercial policy.<sup>1</sup>

The European Free Trade Association has now been ratified by all seven member states and will shortly enter into force. In our view it represents an important effort to lower trade barriers and to strengthen economic cooperation among its members. As such it commands the sympathetic and serious consideration of us all.

\* \* \*

My present remarks will therefore be directed to general observations with respect to the Stockholm Convention and to the approach to it which we think should be taken by the Contracting Parties.

Our overall view of the Stockholm Convention is that, on balance, it deserves the support and approval of the Contracting Parties. While there will be questions concerning specific aspects of the trade arrangements provided for in the convention and, we hope, responsive adjustments on the part of the parties to the convention, nevertheless, as a whole, it is in our judgment in harmony with the spirit and broad objectives of the General Agreement.

Together, the seven countries which make up the E.F.T.A. represent a group with considerable influence on the volume and direction of international trade. Like all regional trading arrangements, the E.F.T.A. will mean change. It will require adjustments for producers and consumers inside the Association and in countries which trade with the Seven. These adjustments may raise

problems. But they will also provide opportunities. If sound and liberal policies are followed by the Seven in the endeavor they are now beginning, the result can be increased trade and prosperity both for the member states and for their trading partners. Ministers of the Seven meeting at Stockholm on November 20, 1959, pointed out that "as world trading nations, the countries of the European Free Trade Association are particularly conscious of Europe's links with the rest of the world." As the E.F.T.A. enters into force, the United States is confident that the convention will be carried out in a manner to maximize trade-creating effects and to minimize problems for other countries, both in Europe and in other parts of the world. . . .

I would like to express satisfaction with the declaration in article 37 of the Stockholm Convention which reaffirms the obligations of member states undertaken in the Gatt. Also it is reassuring to have the statement contained in the replies from the member states to the questions submitted by contracting parties that member states intend to administer and interpret the origin rules in a liberal spirit. I think it unnecessary to discuss in detail provisions of the Stockholm Convention relating to quantitative import restrictions. My delegation would, however, like to indicate its view that the imposition, maintenance, and administration of quantitative import restrictions for financial reasons should depend exclusively on the balance-of-payments position of individual member states.

Mr. Chairman, this in brief is a general statement of our views. My delegation will listen with great interest to the views of other contracting parties and will be prepared to cooperate in what we are confident will be a friendly and constructive review of the Stockholm Convention.

<sup>1</sup> The Stockholm Convention, signed on Nov. 20, 1959, calls for the formation of a free-trade area among the following seven countries: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The first tariff reduction will take place on July 1, 1960.

## The Month in Review

### INTERNATIONAL

#### Benelux

Nov. 1—Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg are united in the Benelux Economic Union. The group has been united in a customs union up to this time.

#### Colombo Plan

Nov. 17—The annual report of the Colombo Plan stresses population growth problems and the need for foreign capital in the Colombo nations. The annual meeting of the Consultative Committee of the plan closes in Tokyo.

#### Disarmament

Nov. 1—Ethiopia and Canada suggest new arms control plans to the General Assembly's Political Committee.

Nov. 2—Chairman of the U.N. Disarmament Commission Padilla Nervo urges the General Assembly Political Committee to postpone its vote on differing disarmament proposals to allow the commission to try to reconcile differences.

Nov. 7—Malaya suggests to the Political Committee that Communist China should participate in disarmament negotiations.

Nov. 8—Cyprus tells the U.N. Political Committee she would like to be made a nuclear weapons-free zone.

Nov. 14—In an effort to reactivate disarmament negotiations, Canada and Iceland tell the Political Committee that world destruction is the alternative to disarmament.

Nov. 27—The sixth annual "Pugwash" conference on disarmament opens in Moscow.

#### General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt)

Nov. 10—Meeting at Geneva for its seventeenth session, the partners in Gatt again exempt Chile from some provisions of the General Agreement because of Chilean economic difficulties.

Nov. 11—Dr. V. M. Wadsworth of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland criti-

cizes a recent U.S. arrangement to dispose of U.S. surplus tobacco to France; he terms the sale close to "market disruption."

Nov. 13—The annual trade report published by Gatt says that West Europe must aid underdeveloped nations; this will help to stabilize the U.S. balance of payments problem.

Nov. 18—Poland becomes an associate of the 38 nations in Gatt; Argentina is accepted as a provisional member; Ireland is accepted as a member.

Nov. 19—At their final meeting, the Gatt nations agree to study ways of avoiding market disruption.

#### Latin America

Nov. 12—Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Colombia meet at San Salvador to discuss cooperation to encourage industrial expansion.

#### Nato

Nov. 20—U.S. Senator Lyndon Johnson arrives in Paris for the sixth annual parliamentary meeting of Nato.

Nov. 21—The Nato parliamentary conference opens.

Nov. 26—Nato Secretary General Paul Henri Spaak approves the idea to give Nato political control over the use of nuclear weapons, the so-called Norstad Plan.

#### Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Nov. 19—It is reported from Paris that 20 nations have agreed on a charter for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to replace the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The U.S. and Canada and the 18 members of O.E.E.C. are members of this new group, which will work toward expanded trade, aid to the underdeveloped states and closer general economic cooperation.

# United Nations (See also *Disarmament, Congo, and Cuba.*)

- Nov. 4—The U.S.S.R. agrees to wait until next year for a special report on the organization of the Secretariat.
- Nov. 10—The U.S.S.R. declares that no enlargement of U.N. councils will be approved by it until Communist China is admitted to U.N. membership.
- Nov. 11—The General Assembly postpones the election of Security Council and Economic and Social Council members.
- Nov. 12—The Trusteeship Committee asks Portugal to report "without delay" on her 10 overseas territories.
- Nov. 21—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld terms the U.N. financial crisis grave and says the U.N. has a "virtually empty" treasury.
- Nov. 22—The General Assembly votes to seat Congo President Joseph Kasavubu. (See also *Congo.*)
- Nov. 23—Figures released at the U.N. show \$37,215,745 owed to the U.N. by member states.
- Nov. 24—Delegates from Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Togo and Tunisia ask the U.N. to take the South-West African mandate away from the Union of South Africa. (See also *British Commonwealth, South Africa.*)
- Nov. 29—Alex Quaison-Sackey, Ghana's U.N. delegate, asks the Assembly to adopt a resolution calling on the colonial powers for "immediate steps" to give their colonies and dependencies independence.
- Nov. 30—The U.S. reveals that it gave the U.N. \$20,000,000 as a cash advance Nov. 26. This will help keep the U.N. Emergency Force in the Congo.

## AFGHANISTAN

- Nov. 1—King Mohammad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan confers with President Tito of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. King Mohammad Zahir arrived yesterday after a visit to the U.A.R.

## ARGENTINA

- Nov. 7—A general strike, involving 2.5 million workers, is staged for 24 hours. The strike is called to protest President Arturo Frondizi's veto of a bill to increase severance pay for dismissed workers.
- Nov. 23—Economics Minister Alvaro C.

Alsogaray announces that he will resign his second post as acting minister of labor.

- Nov. 30—The Argentine government announces that it has put down an attempted revolt by Peronist elements this morning.

## AUSTRIA

- Nov. 3—A new coalition cabinet of conservatives and Socialists, headed by Chancellor Julius Raab, is sworn in. It is the same Cabinet that resigned on October 20.
- Nov. 25—Raab announces that Austria has agreed to compensate Yugoslavia for assets seized during World War II.

## BRAZIL

- Nov. 8—The government orders striking federal transportation workers to return to work or face dismissal.
- Nov. 10—The federal transportation workers unions vote to continue the 3-day old strike.
- Nov. 11—The 500,000 striking transportation workers return to their jobs. The unions warn that a second strike will be held unless wage increases are soon enacted by the Congress.

## BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE Ghana

- Nov. 19—The Government reveals that Ghana and a group of aluminum companies have agreed to terms of a construction contract for a \$140,000,000 smelter to use Volta River power.
- Nov. 21—President Kwame Nkrumah arrives in Mali for a 6-day state visit. (See also *French Community, Mali.*)
- Nov. 24—The Government publishes a White Paper containing eight letters from Nkrumah to deposed Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba, plus letters to Moise Tshombe of Katanga Province and Congolese President Kasavubu.
- Nov. 25—Nkrumah orders 350 Ghanaian policemen to return home from the Congo.
- Nov. 27—Nkrumah claims that the U.S., Britain and France are supporting Belgium's claim to the Congo.

## Great Britain

- Nov. 3—The West Indies Federation, the U.S. and Britain begin to confer on revisions in the 1941 agreement establishing U.S. bases in the West Indies, specifically at Chaguaramas, in Trinidad.



In a party ballot, Hugh Gaitskell defeats Harold Wilson, 166 to 81, for leadership of the labor party.

Nov. 4—The Government tells Commons that U.S. submarine-borne Polaris missiles will be subject to "absolute" British control in British territorial waters. This assurance was aimed at quieting the protests against the establishment of a U.S. anchorage for nuclear submarines carrying nuclear missiles at Holy Loch, Scotland. (See also *United States, Military*, November 1)

Nov. 8—A London communiqué reveals that the U.S. is prepared to "release unconditionally" most of the territory it holds under the 1941 treaty in the West Indies.

Nov. 12—The Commonwealth Relations Office reveals that the constitutional conference on the Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will open in London on December 5. Delegates from the 5 governments involved will attend.

Nov. 14—The Commonwealth offers to supply the U.S. with sugar normally purchased by the U.S. from Cuba.

Nov. 16—Winston Churchill falls and breaks a small bone in his spine.

Nov. 17—The Conservative party wins in six parliamentary by-elections. Liberal party candidates attract more support than Labor candidates in 4 of these elections.

Nov. 30—Winston Churchill celebrates his eighty-sixth birthday. He is recovering.

#### India

Nov. 3—Minister for Public Health Homi J. H. Talyarkhan announces the start of a drive to sterilize 15,000 men next month in the state of Maharashtra; vasectomies will be performed at government expense and the government will compensate for lost working time.

Nov. 4—It is reported in New Delhi that the government has asked the U.S.S.R. to halt Soviet oil shipments for 4 months because of insufficient Indian storage space and distribution facilities.

Nov. 14—It is reported that India has ordered Soviet aircraft.

Nov. 24—More than 100 persons are injured in New Delhi as Sikhs riot for a Punjabi-speaking state.

Nov. 25—Finance Minister Morarji and

Pakistan Finance Minister Mohammed Shoaib issue a communiqué; they state that "good progress" has been made toward the settlement of financial differences.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru says there is little hope of persuading the Chinese to moderate their border claims because they have "a one-track mind."

#### Malaya

Nov. 3—Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra arrives in New York for a visit.

Nov. 20—Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein announces details of the second phase of a rural development plan calling for the division of large areas and dividing up fringe areas around villages; landless applicants will receive some 10 acres of land each.

#### New Zealand

Nov. 26—The Conservative party wins in the general election; Keith J. Holyoake will be the new prime minister, replacing Labor party leader Walter Nash.

#### Nigeria

Nov. 16—Nnamdi Azikiwe is sworn in as first governor general of the independent Federation of Nigeria.

Nov. 19—The Federal Parliament approves a draft defense agreement with Britain, under which Nigerian army, navy and air force personnel will be trained in Britain.

Nov. 28—Students riot in the Nigerian Parliament protesting the signing of a British-Nigerian defense pact.

#### Pakistan

Nov. 8—Officials estimate the death toll in the October 16 and October 31 storms at 12,000 persons.

#### South Africa (See also *United Nations*, November 24)

Nov. 4—The Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia file a complaint with the International Court of Justice charging South Africa with violating its mandate in South-West Africa.

Nov. 14—South Africa says that it will not participate in debate on South-West Africa because debate is not proper while the case is being considered by the World Court.

Nov. 30—A state of emergency is declared in

Pondoland; nonresidents are forbidden to enter the area.

## BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

### Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Nov. 1—Supreme Court Chief Justice Sir Robert Tredgold resigns to protest the Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill giving the government enormous repressive authority.

Nov. 29—The Commonwealth Relations Office reveals that parallel conferences will be held on revision of the Southern Rhodesian constitution while constitutional talks on the federation are going on in December.

### Tanganyika

Nov. 18—Chief Minister Julius K. Nyerere arrives in London to talk to Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod and warns that a federal system should not be forced on East African states.

### West Indies Federation

(See *Great Britain*, Nov. 3 and Nov. 8)

## CHILE

Nov. 8—The U.S. Agriculture Department announces an agreement to sell \$29 million in surplus wheat, cotton, tobacco and other goods to Chile.

## CHINA (People's Republic of)

Nov. 17—President of the National Bank of Cuba Ernesto Guevara arrives in Peking for economic talks.

Nov. 18—At a dinner honoring Guevara, Chou denounces the U.S. for sending naval ships to patrol in Guatemalan and Nicaraguan waters. (See also *Cuba*.)

## CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Nov. 3—A report by the U.N. special representative to the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal, is presented to the General Assembly. Dayal criticizes Colonel Joseph Mobutu and his governing College of Commissioners, and supports Lumumba's claim to power. The report also condemns the return of Belgian technicians to the Congo.

Nov. 4—The U.S. State Department criticizes Dayal's reports and affirms the belief that Belgium is acting in "good faith . . . in its desire to be of assistance in the Congo."

Nov. 5—The advisory commission of the Congo, composed of the 18 nations that have contributed to the U.N. force in the Congo, tells its conciliation committee to work for setting up parliamentary government in the Congo.

Nov. 8—At the U.N. General Assembly, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu asks that the credentials committee seat him and his delegation.

Nov. 9—By a vote of 48-30 (18 abstentions), the General Assembly approves postponing the debate on the Congo pending efforts by the 15-member conciliation commission to restore order in the Congo. The adjournment move was introduced by Ghana and received the support of General Assembly members supporting deposed Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba.

Nov. 10—It is announced that 10 Irish soldiers belonging to the U.N. contingent in Katanga province were ambushed yesterday. 8 of the party are killed. The eleventh member of the patrol is believed to be missing.

Colonel Mobutu arrests the President of Leopoldville province, Cleophas Kamitatu.

The credentials commission of the U.N. General Assembly recommends that the delegation headed by Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu be seated in the Assembly.

Nov. 11—Rioting occurs in Leopoldville, where demonstrators protest the arrest of Kamitatu.

It is reported that Stanleyville, in Oriental Province, has been taken over by pro-Lumumba supporters and that the army is without discipline.

Nov. 13—Kamitatu is released. Mobutu and Kamitatu issue a statement that they have agreed on police and army cooperation in Leopoldville.

Nov. 14—Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny terms the U.N. action in the Congo a failure.

Ex-Premier Lumumba, in a note to General Assembly President Frederick H. Boland, asks that the U.N. sponsor presidential elections in the Congo; he also recommends that the Congo constitution be changed to a presidential rather than a parliamentary system.

Nov. 16—The 15-nation conciliation committee's departure for the Congo is delayed in order to try to gain Kasavubu's support for the mission.

Nov. 17—The Congolese army, 3,000 strong, parades in review through Leopoldville. Colonel Mobutu receives the praise of U.N. officers on the army's "discipline and efficiency."

Kasavubu, at a news conference, announces plans to call a conference of all Congolese leaders, tribal chiefs included, to set up a national government supported by all. Kasavubu reads from a letter he had previously sent to U.N. special representative Dayal, giving his reasons for not accepting the conciliation committee's trip. Instead, he urges that the 25 African heads of state be entrusted with the task of restoring peace to the Congo.

Nov. 18—The General Assembly rejects, by a vote of 51-36 (11 abstentions) a Ghanaian proposal to postpone debate on seating Kasavubu's delegation. (See also *British Commonwealth, Ghana*.)

The Congolese army orders the Ghana embassy staff in the Congo to leave within 48 hours. The Ghanaians are charged with meddling in internal Congolese affairs.

The army also threatens to prevent the arrival of the U.N. conciliation committee.

The U.N. reports continued tribal fighting in Katanga province.

Nov. 19—During debate on recognizing the credentials of the Kasavubu delegation, the Soviet Union and Rumania accuse the U.S. of fomenting unrest in the Congo. The U.S.S.R. and Rumania also support ex-Premier Lumumba's right to govern the Congo.

Nov. 20—The Ghanaian embassy's superior officer, Nathaniel A. Welbeck, Nkrumah's special representative in the Congo, refuses to leave the Congo unless so ordered by Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah. Mobutu reiterates his demand for Welbeck's departure.

Nov. 21—Fighting between U.N. forces and Congolese troops occurs in Leopoldville. This is the first instance of such an outbreak; it was inflamed by the U.N. safeguarding of Welbeck, whose ouster the Congolese army has demanded. It is also reported that the U.N. has agreed to the

removal of Welbeck.

The U.S.S.R. denounces the violence in Leopoldville and requests that U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld report on the incident.

Nov. 22—By a vote of 53-24 (19 abstentions), the General Assembly approves the recommendation of the credentials commission to seat Kasavubu's delegation.

Welbeck leaves the Congo following fighting throughout the night between U.N. and Congolese forces outside the residence of the Ghanaian ambassador, where Welbeck has been under guard.

Nov. 24—Kasavubu departs for the Congo. It is reported that he will give his decision on the projected visit of the African-Asian U.N. conciliation committee next week.

Nov. 25—Joseph Ileo, Kasavubu's appointed successor to deposed Premier Lumumba, opens talks on convening a conference of all Congolese leaders.

It is reported that a 3-man mission from Ileo's Cabinet, meeting with President Moise Tshombe and other leaders of secessionist Katanga province, has reached agreement on holding a roundtable conference scheduled for next month.

Nov. 28—It is reported that Lumumba escaped last night from his residence despite U.N. and Congolese guards.

Nov. 29—Lumumba's whereabouts are still unknown.

Nov. 30—At the U.N., the Soviet delegation demands the removal of the U.N. emergency force in the Congo. (See also *International, United Nations*, Nov. 30.)

## COSTA RICA

Nov. 12—A civil guard patrol battles with rebels near the border, who are about to invade Nicaragua.

## CUBA

Nov. 1—The U.N. General Assembly rejects Cuban and Soviet moves to open debate on the question of U.S. aggression in Cuba; the vote is 42-29 (with 18 abstentions). The General Assembly, 53-11 (27 abstentions), votes to consider Cuban charges against the U.S. in its political committee.

Nov. 2—President Osvaldo Dorticos states that Cuba will never attack the U.S.

Guantanamo naval base but will claim it in time "through the proper political procedure."

Nov. 12—It is reported that in a note to the Cuban government yesterday the U.S. has protested the execution of 3 Americans last month for participating in armed attacks on the Castro regime.

Nov. 13—Castro supporters interrupt the mass at the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Santiago to protest the reading of a pastoral letter that criticizes communism.

The U.S. Commerce Department discloses that a total of \$1 billion in U.S. investments in Cuba has been seized by the Castro regime.

Nov. 17—Cuba denounces the U.S. for sending navy ships to the Caribbean to protect Nicaragua and Guatemala from any threatened invasion. President Eisenhower issued the order at the request of Nicaragua and Guatemala, which fear Communist-led attacks. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Nov. 17.)

Nov. 18—It is reported by "most reliable diplomatic sources" that the Soviet Union has warned Premier Fidel Castro against creating too much hostility in the Western hemisphere by constant reference to Soviet rocket protection for Cuba.

Nov. 22—*Hoy*, Communist newspaper in Cuba, disclaims stories that the Soviet Union has warned Cuba to cut down its aggressive policies.

Nov. 30—Directing soldiers against anti-Castro rebels in central Cuba's Escambray Mountains, Major Manuel Fajardo is killed in a gun battle. A total of 10 bombs are exploded in Havana.

It is reported that Communist China has agreed to lend Cuba \$60 million, interest free, for a 5-year period. The loan was agreed on during talks between Cuban National Bank President Ernesto Guevara and Red Chinese Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien in Peking. (See also *China*.)

#### DENMARK

Nov. 15—Parliamentary elections for 179 seats in the Folketing are held.

Nov. 16—Complete, but unofficial, returns give the Social Democrats 77 seats, an increase of 7 parliamentary seats for Premier Viggo Kampmann's party.

Nov. 18—Kampmann forms a coalition government with the Radical Liberals.

#### EL SALVADOR

Nov. 20—5,000 persons demonstrate in support of the 6-man junta which deposed President Jose Maria Lemus on October 26 and in opposition to an alleged conspiracy against the junta. The crowd also expresses disapproval of the U.S. failure to recognize the new government.

#### ETHIOPIA

Nov. 2—Emperor Haile Selassie's thirtieth year of rule is observed.

#### FINLAND

Nov. 27—President Urho Kekkonen, recently returned from talks in Moscow, acclaims the Soviet Union's agreement to lease the southern sector of the Saimaa Canal, which was on Finnish land seized by the U.S.S.R.

#### FRANCE

Nov. 8—Debate in the French Senate on the military budget for 1961 opens. Debate will center on an independent nuclear striking force for France.

Nov. 10—The Senate on a procedural motion in effect vetoes an independent nuclear striking power for France. The Senate vote (186-83) does not ultimately kill the measure; it can be overridden by the National Assembly.

Nov. 17—The National Assembly begins a second reading on the measure for an independent nuclear force.

Nov. 22—A motion of censure in the National Assembly fails to receive the necessary votes to cause the government to fall. Behind the motion of censure was the nuclear deterrent measure, which will now go for a second reading to the Senate.

Nov. 30—The Senate rejects the bill to develop an independent nuclear capability for France; the vote of 182-84 on the second reading is actually on a procedural motion to cut off all debate on the bill.

#### FRANCE OVERSEAS

##### Algeria

Nov. 1—The tenth plenary session of the Protestant Federation of France urges all religious groups to support a truce in Algeria.

Nov. 3—*Pravda*, Communist party newspaper, sharply criticizes French President



Charles de Gaulle for failing to solve the Algerian "impasse."

The trial of 20 leaders of the revolt in Algiers in January, 1960, opens in Paris.

Nov. 6—The Front for French Algeria (the largest right-wing group) criticizes a recent de Gaulle statement that "an Algerian republic will exist some day."

Nov. 11—Several thousand youths in Algeria demonstrate in support of keeping Algeria French.

Nov. 16—It is formally announced that President de Gaulle and his Cabinet have decided to ask the French people to approve in a referendum vote his proposal to allow the Algerians to decide their own fate. It is reported that de Gaulle wants to set up a provisional government in Algeria, separate from that of metropolitan France, that would include Muslims as well as European Algerians.

Pierre Lagailarde, leader of the January, 1960, revolt, now on trial in Paris, is released on bail.

Nov. 22—Minister of Education Louis Joxe is named minister of state in charge of Algerian affairs. Minister Delegate Pierre Guillaumat succeeds Joxe as education minister.

## FRENCH COMMUNITY

### Cameroon

Nov. 3—Union of Populations party chief Felix Moumie dies of thallium poisoning.

### Ivory Coast

Nov. 27—In elections for a president of the Ivory Coast (whose government is modeled on the U.S.), Felix Houphouet-Boigny wins 98 per cent of the vote, according to unofficial returns. He is the only candidate.

### Mali

Nov. 27—Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah returns from a visit to Mali and announces that Mali and Ghana will set up a common parliament.

### Mauritania

Nov. 28—Mauritania becomes an independent republic.

## GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (WEST)

Nov. 3—2,500 West German troops arrive at 2 French training camps in the Marne.

Nov. 12—It is reported from Bonn that West

Germany is negotiating with France over setting up 2 Luftwaffe airbases in southern France.

Nov. 13—It is reported that key ministries and industrial leaders have agreed to establish a foreign aid fund of \$1 billion for 1961.

Nov. 21—Top level financial talks open in Bonn between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson and U.S. Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Nov. 23.)

Nov. 22—It is reported that the U.S. financial delegation to Bonn has been unable to secure any definite aid commitments.

Nov. 25—It is disclosed that West Germany will reopen trade talks with East Germany despite East German travel restrictions on West German travel to East Berlin.

A statement by Chancellor Adenauer appearing recently in a West German paper is reported; the Chancellor has advocated a more "flexible position" on a trade pact with East Germany.

Nov. 27—It is reported that East Germany has indicated that in negotiating a trade deal with West Germany, it wants a separate arrangement to cover trade with West Berlin.

## GUATEMALA

Nov. 13—Rebellion, led by military officers, erupts in Guatemala. The government announces that the revolt has been quelled, and proclaims a state of siege.

Nov. 14—The government of President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes accuses Cuba of being involved in the uprising. The government asks the U.S. to patrol Guatemalan waters for protection. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Nov. 17.)

Nov. 16—It is reported from the northeast sector of Guatemala that the last rebel stronghold in the area has fallen.

## HAITI

Nov. 22—Martial law is declared in Haiti. University students, not attending classes because of a general strike to protest the arrests of college students last September under the state of siege law, are given 12 hours to return to classes. The government also dissolves student associations.

Nov. 23—President Francois Duvalier orders that the University of Haiti be closed.

Students do not heed the president's warning to return to class or be expelled.

Nov. 24—Interior Minister Aurele Joseph announces that Roman Catholic Archbishop Francois Poirier has been ousted from Haiti. The Archbishop is charged with having contributed \$7,000 to university students, for the overthrow of Duvalier.

Nov. 28—The government refuses to accept the Vatican appointment of Bishop Remy Augustin to replace Poirier during his absence. The Bishop is named to serve as apostolic administrator.

## HONDURAS

Nov. 18—The International Court of Justice awards border areas, claimed by Nicaragua, to Honduras.

## INDONESIA

Nov. 10—President Sukarno opens the Congress (Madjelis).

## IRAQ

Nov. 15—The Iraqi Cabinet is reorganized; 3 ministers are removed.

## ISRAEL

Nov. 17—West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt confers in Israel with Israeli Premier David Ben-Gurion.

Nov. 27—Brigadier Zvi Tsur is named to succeed Major General Chaim Laskow as army chief of staff, beginning January 1, 1961.

## ITALY

Nov. 8—The results of municipal, provincial and regional elections held on November 6-7 are announced: the Christian Democrats lead all other parties.

## JAPAN

Nov. 3—Otoya Yamaguchi, the 17-year-old assassin of Socialist leader Inejiro Asanuma on October 12, hangs himself in his jail cell.

Nov. 20—Elections to the 467-member House of Representatives are held.

Nov. 26—Complete returns give Premier Hayato Ikeda's Liberal Democratic party 296 seats in the Diet, an increase of 13. Four independents have joined the government party to give Ikeda 300 votes. The Socialists have won 145 seats; Democratic Socialists, 17; Communists, 3; Independents, 1; and minor parties, 1.

## JORDAN

Nov. 17—It is announced that Jordan and Iraq will resume diplomatic relations in December. Relations were suspended in July, 1958, after the Iraqi revolution.

## KOREA, SOUTH

Nov. 25—Finance Minister Kim Yung Sun announces that South Korea will receive a total of \$236 million in U.S. aid during the present fiscal year.

## LAOS

Nov. 11—Major Bounphen Isixiengmay, chief of the Third Infantry Battalion at Luang Prabang, announces that he no longer supports the government of Premier Souvanna Phouma, but has switched his allegiance to the pro-Western, Rightist faction headed by General Phoumi Nosa-van.

It is reported that the Rightist, pro-Western forces have seized Luang Prabang.

Nov. 17—It is announced that the Cabinet, at a meeting yesterday, has decided to establish friendly relations with Communist China and to send missions to Peking and Communist North Vietnam.

Nov. 20—Premier Phouma returns to Vientiane after peace talks with the Neo Lao Hak Xat (political branch of the Pathet Lao), and declares that he has signed an agreement with the pro-Communist leader, Prince Souphanouvong. Phouma declares that Souphanouvong has agreed to support his neutralist government.

Nov. 30—It is reported that fighting has erupted between Laotian government troops and Right-wing rebels led by General Nosavan.

## MOROCCO

Nov. 15—It is announced that the Soviet Union's offer of military aid (primarily jet planes) has been accepted by Morocco.

## NICARAGUA

Nov. 11—President Luis Somoza Debayle says that the rebel invasion attempt near the Costa Rican border on November 9-11 is under control and that it will not be necessary to proclaim a state of martial law. (See also *Costa Rica, Honduras, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Nov. 17.)

## POLAND

Nov. 16—Jerzy Albrecht, one of 8 secretaries of the Polish United Workers Party (Communist), is named finance minister. He succeeds Tadeusz Dietrich, who died last June.

## TUNISIA

Nov. 1—At a rally to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the Algerian war, over 30,000 Tunisians shout anti-Western, anti-U.S., anti-Nato sentiments. (See also *Algeria*.)

## TURKEY

Nov. 1—President Cemal Gursel promises to review the dismissal of 147 university professors announced last week.

Nov. 13—President Gursel announces that he has dismissed 14 of the 37 members of the National Unity Committee, the military junta that governed Turkey since the overthrow of Premier Adnan Menderes in May, 1960. Gursel declares that the committee has been dissolved to safeguard the national interest. The 14 dismissed military officers have retired from the armed services.

Nov. 22—At the trial of government leaders ousted last May, the High Court of Justice finds that ex-Premier Menderes is not responsible for the death of an illegitimate child born to him and a Turkish operatic singer. Menderes faces 7 other charges.

Nov. 28—The draft bill establishing a Turkish legislature is made public: a bicameral assembly will be composed of a 262-member House of Representatives (lower body) and a 23-man Senate (upper body), composed of the incumbent military junta.

## U.S.S.R., THE

Nov. 5—The U.S.S.R. denies a report from Vienna yesterday that Soviet Premier Khrushchev had been deposed by ex-Premier Georgi M. Malenkov and a clique of followers.

One of the Soviet bloc's many chiefs of state gathering in Moscow for the celebration of the forty-third anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Communist Chinese Chief of State Liu Shao-chi, arrives; he praises Moscow-Peking solidarity.

Nov. 7—Russia celebrates the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution with a parade in Red Square.

Lauding Soviet advances at a private

party in the Kremlin, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev declares that "peace is inevitable" and that "war will not help us reach our goal."

Nov. 9—Soviet Premier Khrushchev congratulates U.S. President-elect John F. Kennedy on his victory.

Nov. 13—Prominent Soviet and U.S. lawyers, economists, writers, educators, meeting unofficially during the last two weeks at American Dartmouth College, issue a joint statement that such conferences can add immeasurably to the cause of "mutual understanding." The meeting was financed by the Ford Foundation.

Nov. 15—The Soviet government announces that the ruble is to be converted. The new ruble, effective January 1, 1961, will be valued at U.S. \$1.11. Soviet citizens will receive one new ruble for every 10 old ones.

Nov. 17—Khrushchev officially opens Friendship University in Moscow for students from Asian-African nations. The university actually opened on October 1.

Nov. 19—President Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia departs from Moscow. Other top Communist leaders continue secret summit talks in progress since November 7.

Nov. 23—It is reported that talks among some 81 Communist leaders meeting in Moscow are continuing. An editorial in *Pravda*, official Soviet Communist party newspaper, urges the Communist bloc to line up behind Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence. No specific mention is made of the Communist summit talks.

Nov. 24—It is reported that the "hard line" advocated by Chinese Communist leader Liu is receiving support from Latin America, North Korea, Indonesia and Albania at the Moscow talks.

Nov. 26—It is reported that the Moscow summit talks have disbanded and that the work of issuing a communiqué on Soviet bloc unity has been turned over to a committee.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Nov. 2—The U.A.R. and Poland sign a 3-year agreement to increase their trade by 20 per cent.

Nov. 27—A statement made by U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the end

of his 10-day visit to the Sudan with Sudanese Premier Ibrahim Abboud is disclosed. The two leaders declare themselves in favor of joint development of the Nile Valley.

Nov. 30—It is confirmed in Cairo that ex-President Mohammed Naguib, the first post-revolutionary president of Egypt, has been out of prison since last July. Naguib was ousted by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in October, 1954.

## UNITED STATES

### Agriculture

Nov. 10—In a semi-final report, the Department of Agriculture predicts a record total crop for the United States in 1960.

### Civil Rights (See also *Supreme Court*, November 14)

Nov. 2—Alabama officials rule that the Reverend Martin Luther King is not eligible to vote by absentee ballot in Montgomery because he failed to pay 1958 poll taxes before the February, 1960, deadline for taxes in arrears.

### Economy

Nov. 25—The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reveals figures showing that the amount of gold held in the United States has dropped to \$17,986,000,000, the lowest level since January, 1940.

### Foreign Policy

Nov. 1—President Dwight D. Eisenhower notes that "whatever steps may be appropriate" will be taken to defend the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba.

Nov. 3—The State Department reveals that the U.S. will give \$10 million for a new development bank that is being established to help Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.

Nov. 16—Eisenhower orders all agencies to reduce foreign spending to try to bring a halt to the growing deficit in the nation's balance of payments and the resulting drain on U.S. gold reserves.

Nov. 17—The President orders U.S. naval units to patrol the waters of Central America and to shoot if necessary, to stop a Communist-led invasion of Guatemala or Nicaragua. Both Guatemala and Nicaragua have requested U.S. aid. (See also *Guatemala*.)

The President rules that effective De-

cember 16, Polish imports may enjoy most-favored nation treatment and consequently lower tariffs. Tariff benefits to Poland were ruled out for the last 8 years.

Nov. 19—Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson and Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon start a European trip to discuss ways to stem the drain on U.S. gold. (See also *Germany*.)

Nov. 20—It is revealed in Washington that the State Department has ordered the elimination of all but the most essential travel of foreign service officers after January 1, 1961.

Nov. 22—It is revealed in Washington that the Navy plans a visit of a small group of ships to the West coast of Africa for two months beginning January 1.

Nov. 23—A communiqué notes that the U.S. financial mission to Bonn, Germany, has failed in its request for a direct payment of \$600 million by West Germany to cover American troop costs there.

It is revealed in Washington that the Departments of State and Defense have agreed to propose the establishment of a nuclear-armed strategic force directly under Nato.

Nov. 25—Vice-President elect Lyndon Johnson confers with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan about summit conference plans.

The Secretary of Defense orders the beginning of progressive reduction in the number of dependents accompanying servicemen stationed overseas.

Nov. 26—Anderson and Dillon return and reveal that negotiations with West Germany were conducted "in a most friendly atmosphere." The West European trip is generally regarded as a failure.

Nov. 29—A federal grand jury charges Robert Soblen with wartime espionage for the U.S.S.R.; Soblen is the brother of Jack Sobel, now in prison as a convicted Russian spy.

It is announced in Manila that the U.S. and the Philippines have come to an agreement on revision of their 1947 military bases pact.

### Government

Nov. 1—The Interstate Commerce Commission agrees to endorse a private \$4.5 billion loan for the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad.



Nov. 8—In Puerto Rico, Governor Luis Munoz Marin wins more than 58 per cent of a record 780,073 votes. Marin, who has held the governorship since the office became elective in 1948, was strongly opposed by the Roman Catholic bishops. A Catholic, he is a Popular Democrat.

Nov. 10—Kennedy reveals that Allen W. Dulles will retain his post as director of the Central Intelligence Agency and J. Edgar Hoover will continue as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Nov. 11—George V. Allen resigns as director of the U.S. Information Agency.

Nov. 14—Assistant to the President Wilton B. Persons meets with John F. Kennedy's special representative, Clark Clifford, to discuss an orderly transfer of administrative responsibility.

Nov. 20—Mayor Dona Felisa Rincon de Gautier of San Juan, Puerto Rico, is refused communion in San Juan's Catholic Cathedral until she does public penance for supporting Governor Marin.

Nov. 23—President Eisenhower returns with bursitis from a 2-week Georgia vacation.

Nov. 27—Mayor of San Juan Felisa Rincon de Gautier receives communion at St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York; earlier this week the Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Juan said that no sanctions are to be enforced for support of Governor Marin.

#### Labor

Nov. 28—Carpenters Union President Maurice Hutcheson and Vice-President William Blaier are sentenced to from 2 to 14 years imprisonment because of their participation in Indiana highway scandals.

#### Military Policy

Nov. 1—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan tells the House of Commons that U.S. Polaris submarines will be based at Holy Loch on the Firth of Clyde in Scotland.

Nov. 2—*The New York Times* publishes a summary of a confidential army study that terms the nation's air raid warning system "basically unsound" and outdated; it is charged by the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Information that the report is being withheld from the public by the Administration.

Nov. 3—The Explorer VIII orbits.

Nov. 8—Rear Admiral Edward J. O'Donnell's appointment as commander of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba, is announced. He succeeds Rear Admiral Frank W. Fenno, Jr.

A Mercury capsule launching fails.

Nov. 12—A Discoverer XVII is launched into orbit.

Nov. 21—A third failure marks the launching of a Project Mercury capsule.

Nov. 22—The Ethan Allen, the Navy's strongest nuclear submarine, is launched.

Nov. 23—Tiros II goes into orbit; this is the second weather-eye satellite.

Nov. 28—The Air Force reveals plans to close Mitchel Air Force Base (by June, 1961); and Chennault Air Force Base, and MacDill Air Force Base (by June, 1962).

Nov. 30—A pair of satellites launched from Cape Canaveral fails to orbit.

#### Politics

Nov. 1—Republican and Democratic National Committees report to the House of Representatives that each party has spent some \$2.5 million during the campaign.

Nov. 2—President Eisenhower appears personally in New York with Vice-President Richard Nixon and vice-presidential candidate Henry Cabot Lodge for the first time in the election campaign.

Nov. 8—Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy is elected thirty-fifth President of the United States; Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson will be the new Vice-President. The electoral and the popular vote totals are still in doubt, with a very narrow margin giving Kennedy the victory over Vice-President Nixon. With 12 Senate seats going to Democrats, the Democrats retain control of both houses of Congress and hold a majority of the governorships. New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Texas and Illinois are carried for Kennedy. He wins all the Southern states except Florida, Virginia and Tennessee.

Nov. 9—John F. Kennedy accepts the presidency at 1:45 p.m.; Nixon concedes defeat at 12 noon. Eisenhower and Nixon wire congratulations to Kennedy.

Tallies reveal that 15 gubernatorial races are won by Democrats and 12, by Republicans. The Democrats now control 34 of the 50 governorships. The elec-

toral and the popular vote totals are still in doubt.

Nov. 14—Kennedy flies to Key Biscayne to talk to Nixon.

Nov. 16—A tally of absentee ballots adds California's 32 electoral votes to Nixon's total. The unofficial electoral vote total is 300 for Kennedy, 223 for Nixon.

Nov. 21—The Democratic National Committee reveals that the Democratic Digest will be published from now on by a non-profit corporation.

Nov. 24—Republican leaders in Cook County, Illinois, plan a court contest of the presidential election vote in Cook County. A recount may also be demanded in Texas.

### Segregation

Nov. 10—Federal Judge J. Skelly Wright issues an order restraining Louisiana from blocking plans to desegregate New Orleans public schools.

Nov. 13—The Louisiana state legislature passes laws giving the legislature control of New Orleans schools; all Louisiana schools are ordered closed for a holiday.

Nov. 14—Orleans parish school officials ignore the state legislative order as 4 Negro girls enter 2 white elementary schools escorted by federal deputy marshals.

This is the first grade school integration in the deep South.

Nov. 16—Some 2,000 white youths riot in New Orleans protesting school integration.

Nov. 18—A federal court orders integration to continue in New Orleans elementary schools.

The University of Tennessee admits Negro undergraduates.

Nov. 26—Robed and hooded Ku Klux Klansmen parade in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, when sitdown demonstrations begin again after a month's truce.

Nov. 30—A 3-judge federal court enjoins Louisiana state and local officials from further interference with the process of integrating Louisiana schools. State laws aimed at halting desegregation are voided.

### Supreme Court

Nov. 7—The Court agrees to hear a Maryland case concerned with whether a state may make a declaration of belief in God a requirement for public office.

Nov. 14—Voting 6 to 3, the Court dismisses

a further appeal of Dr. Willard Uphaus, pacifist from New Hampshire, who has refused to give his state's attorney general the names of some associates. Uphaus is serving a prison term for civil contempt.

The Court rules that a state may not alter city boundaries in order to exclude Negro voters; a 1957 Alabama state statute changing the boundaries of Tuskegee is at issue.

### VENEZUELA

Nov. 11—President Romulo Betancourt accepts the resignation of his cabinet, which was submitted on November 6.

Nov. 22—A new coalition cabinet is sworn in.

Nov. 27—Anti-government rioting enters its third day. Some 3 persons have been killed and 50 wounded in clashes thus far. Militia and police try to restore order.

Nov. 28—President Betancourt calls out the army and suspends constitutional rights as anti-government rioting continues.

Nov. 30—Left-wing students entrench themselves in a building on the campus of Central University, in defiance of Betancourt's government.

At an emergency session of the O.A.S. Council, the Venezuelan delegate charges that the Dominican Republic is planning to invade his country. He asks the O.A.S. to investigate the Dominican Republic for signs of such aggression. The Dominican delegate denies the accusations.

### VIETNAM, SOUTH

Nov. 11—A coup in Saigon is staged by 4 paratroop battalions. The overthrow of the pro-Western government of President Ngo Dinh Diem is reported.

Nov. 12—President Ngo Dinh Diem's government puts down the insurrection. The Fifth and Seventh Infantry Divisions come to the President's rescue at his request.

### YUGOSLAVIA (See also *Austria*.)

Nov. 28—President Tito, in a speech in honor of the national holiday, Day of the Republic, declares that the projected constitution for Yugoslavia is scheduled for 1962. The constitution would cut down state control of local and economic affairs.

Nov. 30—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koca Popovic departs for Rome on a visit of friendship and goodwill.

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